The Americans With Disabilities Act in Cyberspace: Applying the “Nexus” Approach to Private Internet Websites by Moberly, Richard E.
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
College of Law, Faculty Publications Law, College of 
2004 
The Americans With Disabilities Act in Cyberspace: Applying the 
“Nexus” Approach to Private Internet Websites 
Richard E. Moberly 
University of Nebraska, rmoberly2@unl.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub 
 Part of the Legal Studies Commons 
Moberly, Richard E., "The Americans With Disabilities Act in Cyberspace: Applying the “Nexus” Approach 
to Private Internet Websites" (2004). College of Law, Faculty Publications. 29. 
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub/29 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of 
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in College of Law, Faculty Publications by an authorized 
administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. 
The Americans With Disabilities
Act in Cyberspace: Applying the
“Nexus” Approach to Private
Internet Websites
by Richard E. Moberly*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the increasing importance of the Internet has drawn
attention to the exclusion of certain parts of society from participating
fully in the advantages brought about by the Internet’s technological
advances. This “digital divide,” as some have labeled it,1 particularly
excludes some individuals with disabilities, such as those with visual,
auditory, or muscular impairments, who are unable to access many
features of today’s Internet.2 Although private efforts encourage
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Elizabeth Wilson, Professor Adam Milani, and the editors of the Mercer Law Review for
inviting him to participate in the Law Review Symposium on “The Internet: Place,
Property, or Thing—All or None of the Above?” The views contained in this Article are
those of the Author and not necessarily the Firm.
1. See, e.g., Andrew G. Celli, Jr. & Kenneth M. Dreifach, Postcards from the Edge:
Surveying the Digital Divide, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 53, 53-54 (2002) (noting the
use of the term “digital divide” in nearly 150 articles appearing in the New York Times
from 1998 to 2001, a government commission report, and a Presidential address
“denouncing it”); Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal’s Fourteenth
Annual Hastings Computer Law Symposium, “Digital Divide, Digital Opportunities” (2002).
2. See Jeffrey Scott Ranen, Was Blind But Now I See: The Argument for ADA
Applicability to the Internet, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 389, 390 (2002) (noting that 98%
of websites “are to some extent inaccessible to the visually disabled”); Applicability of the
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) to Private Internet Sites: Hearings Before the House
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websites to adopt voluntary standards to make the Internet more
accessible to these individuals,3 no clear governmental directive
specifically aimed at privately-owned websites currently requires broad
accessibility for the disabled.4
As a result, advocates for the disabled assert that Title III of the
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”)5 should be interpreted
to apply to private websites, requiring a website to be fully accessible
unless the website can demonstrate that providing accessible information
would be an undue burden.6 Other commentators agree that Internet
accessibility for the disabled is an important and worthy aim, but argue
that the ADA is not the proper means to accomplish that goal.7 In
2000, the United States House of Representatives heard from advocates
of the disabled, industry representatives, and legal experts regarding
this very issue,8 but ultimately Congress has not responded to the
questions raised by that hearing.
Until recently this debate regarding whether the ADA should apply to
private Internet websites was relatively theoretical.9 In the last year,
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 31-32
(2000) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Steven Lucas, Vice President and Chief
Technology Officer, Privasak, Inc.), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/2.htm;
Justin D. Petruzzelli, Adjust Your Font Size: Websites are Public Accommodations Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 1063, 1066, 1091 (2001); Jonathan
Bick, Americans with Disabilities Act and the Internet, 10 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 205, 226
(2000) (noting that the needs of blind, deaf, mobility-impaired, and learning disabled
individuals need to be considered with regard to accessibility issues on the Internet).
Accessibility to the Internet is possible for disabled individuals; however, it may require
that owners, operators, and designers of websites create or redesign websites by, among
other things, adding text descriptions to pictures and graphics to make them readable by
computerized screen readers, adding closed captioning for audio streaming, and simplifying
web layouts. See infra Part IV.
3. The most comprehensive of these efforts may be the accessibility guidelines
developed by the Web Accessibility Initiative (WAI) of the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C). See http://www.w3c.org/WAI/about.html.
4. The federal government has mandated that all government websites must be
accessible to the disabled, and it has developed comprehensive guidelines to accomplish
this mandate. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2000).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000).
6. See, e.g., Petruzzelli, supra note 2, at 1088-91; Ranen, supra note 2, at 415-17.
7. See, e.g., Kelly E. Konkright, An Analysis of the Applicability of Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act to Private Internet Access Providers, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 713,
743-46 (2001); Patrick Maroney, The Wrong Tool for the Right Job, 2 VAND. J. ENT. L. &
PRAC. 191, 191-92 (2000).
8. See generally Hearings, supra note 2.
9. After the hearing, no Congressional action appeared forthcoming, and only two
lawsuits had been filed against Internet-related entities requesting relief under the ADA.
The first lawsuit, brought by the National Federation of the Blind against America Online
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however, this discussion moved from academic theory to real-world
practicality because two events highlighted the questions surrounding
this unresolved debate.
First, in Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.,10 a federal
district court in Florida dismissed a lawsuit filed against Southwest
Airlines and its website, southwest.com, because the court explicitly
determined that the ADA did not apply to any private website.11 The
issue at the heart of the case concerned Title III’s requirement that its
nondiscrimination provisions apply only to “places of public accommoda-
tion.”12 Relying upon a narrow reading of the statutory and regulatory
language, the court in Access Now determined that a “place of public
accommodation” must be a physical facility, and because a website is not
a physical place, the ADA did not apply.13
Second, the National Council on Disability (“NCD”), an independent
federal agency charged with making recommendations to the President
and Congress on issues affecting individuals with disabilities,14
released a position paper in which it advocated that the ADA should
apply to all private websites engaged in commercial activity.15 The
NCD and other advocates for the disabled base their argument on the
ADA’s broad remedial scope and the Internet’s increasingly important
role in accessing goods and services in today’s economy.16
This Article takes a position between these two extremes by advocat-
ing that the ADA applies to some, but not all, Internet websites.
(“AOL”), was settled without resolving these issues. See Paul Taylor, The Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Internet, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 26, 32 (2001). The second
lawsuit resulted in an unpublished opinion without precedential value. Brief of the United
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, at 7, Hooks v. OKBridge, Inc., No. 99-
214, slip op. at 7 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 1999) (No. 99-50891), available at http://www.us
doj.gov/crt/briefs/hooks.htm.
10. 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002).
11. Id. at 1321. At the time of the writing of this Article, an appeal of this decision was
pending before the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See Brief for Appellants, Access
Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (No. 02-16163-
BB).
12. Access Now, 227 F. Supp. at 1314; 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
13. 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.
14. See National Council on Disability Home Page, available at http://www.ncd.gov (last
updated Nov. 5, 2003).
15. See Position Paper, National Council on Disability, at 1 (July 10, 2003), available
at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/pdf/adaInternet.pdf [hereinafter Position
Paper].
16. Id.; Bick, supra note 2, at 213-14; Matthew A. Stowe, Interpreting “Place of Public
Accommodation” Under Title III of the ADA: A Technical Determination with Potentially
Broad Civil Rights Implications, 50 DUKE L.J. 297, 323-25 (2000); Petruzzelli, supra note
2, at 1082-83.
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Specifically, this Article advocates broader use of the nexus approach,
which some courts use in analogous contexts to apply the ADA’s
accessibility standards to intangible services connected to physical places
of public accommodation.17 Under the nexus approach, the ADA should
apply only to websites that have a connection, or nexus, to a physical
place of public accommodation. For such websites, the ADA may require
alterations to become accessible to individuals with disabilities.18 The
ADA, however, should not apply generally to the rest of the Internet
because remaining websites do not have a connection with a physical
place of public accommodation.19 As set forth below, this approach
more accurately reflects the statutory language of the ADA while it
appropriately recognizes the nature of the Internet and its use in the
commercial context.
Interestingly, each of the positions articulated by Access Now and the
NCD recognizes the ADA’s nexus requirement, but each misconstrues it.
Although the court in Access Now accurately held that the ADA applies
only to physical places of public accommodation,20 the court improperly
failed to recognize that under the nexus approach, the ADA’s application
to such places may include regulation of both “tangible and intangible”
barriers to access those places.21 These barriers arguably include an
inaccessible website in which only nondisabled individuals can access the
goods and services of a place of public accommodation.22 Thus the
Internet’s lack of physicality should not necessarily prevent application
of the ADA to a website connected to a physical place of public accommo-
dation. Moreover, although the NCD position paper recognized the
existence of the nexus approach, it ultimately advocated a broader
application of the ADA to the entire Internet. The NCD objected to the
distinction required by the nexus approach between those websites that
are connected to a physical place of public accommodation and those that
are not.23 However, the NCD exaggerated the problems that might
result from this distinction and failed to recognize the important policy
reasons supporting this distinction.24
17. See Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1284 n.8 (11th Cir. 2002);
Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000).
18. See discussion infra Part IV.
19. See discussion infra Part III(A).
20. Access Now, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1319-21.
21. See Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1283.
22. See id. at 1284.
23. See Position Paper, supra note 15, at 25-27.
24. See discussion infra Part III(D).
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Although the nexus approach presents the best alternative to
applying the ADA to a situation not contemplated by Congress,25 by
relying on it, this Article makes value judgments and draws conscious
conclusions regarding the nature of the Internet and how (and whether)
our laws should be interpreted to accommodate the Internet’s unique
role in our society. For example, this Article asserts that the ADA
cannot apply to all Internet websites because the statute applies only to
physical places of public accommodation. A judgment regarding the
essence of the Internet is, of course, imbedded in this conclusion. The
Internet is something other than a physical “place.”26 Additionally,
relying on the nexus approach recognizes that although the Internet is
not a place, it provides critical communication services and accessibility
to goods and services sold by places of public accommodation. Therefore,
the ADA should regulate the manner in which these physical places of
public accommodation use their website to communicate with the public
and to permit access to their goods and services because those types of
roles should qualify as having a nexus to the place of public accommoda-
tion.27 Finally, reliance on the nexus approach to conclude that the
ADA plays only a limited role with regard to private websites reflects a
value judgment regarding the applicability of statutory regulation to
unforeseen, yet transformative, technological advancements such as the
Internet. Applying the nexus approach involves a conscious decision
that Congress, not the judiciary, is in the best position to regulate the
Internet because Congress can, and should, balance the needs of the
Internet industry with the requirements of individuals with disabili-
ties.28 All of these broader issues are inherently contained in any
discussion of whether the ADA applies generally to Internet websites;
this Article addresses them within that context.
Part II of this Article provides a brief overview of the ADA’s require-
ments as well as an examination of the analyses used by the court in
Access Now and the NCD in arriving at contradictory conclusions
regarding the ADA’s application to the Internet. Part III sets forth the
nexus approach and its application to the Internet. Specifically, Part III
analyzes both the ADA’s statutory language and the nature of the
Internet for support regarding application of the nexus approach. The
25. The statute’s plain language does not include any direct or indirect reference to
Internet websites. See Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (emphasizing that the “plain
and unambiguous language of the statute . . . does not include Internet websites among the
definitions of ‘places of public accommodation’ ”).
26. See infra Part III(C)(1).
27. See infra Part III(C)(2).
28. See infra Part III(D)(2).
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final section of Part III provides normative justifications for the
application of the nexus approach rather than either of the more extreme
alternatives. Finally, Part IV briefly discusses the practical require-
ments for a website that may be regulated by the ADA.
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW
A. The ADA
When the ADA became law in 1990, it mandated sweeping protections
for individuals with disabilities with regard to employment (under Title
I of the Act),29 contacts with state and local governments (under Title
II of the Act),30 and interactions with private entities (under Title III
of the Act).31 Title III is the part of the ADA most relevant to private
Internet websites; therefore, this Article focuses solely on Title III.
Title III of the ADA applies only to “places of public accommoda-
tion.”32 Places of public accommodation must affect commerce and fall
within twelve specified categories of types of places.33 Some statutory
29. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000).
30. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000).
31. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000). Another part of the ADA provides certain
requirements for telecommunications companies. See 47 U.S.C. § 225(a)(2) (2000).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
33. Id. § 12181(7). The definition, in its entirety, is as follows:
(A) an inn, hotel, motel, or other place of lodging, except for an establishment
located within a building that contains not more than five rooms for rent or hire
and that is actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as the
residence of such proprietor;
(B) a restaurant, bar, or other establishment serving food or drink;
(C) a motion picture house, theater, concert hall, stadium, or other place of
exhibition or entertainment;
(D) an auditorium, convention center, lecture hall, or other place of public
gathering;
(E) a bakery, grocery store, clothing store, hardware store, shopping center, or
other sales or rental establishment;
(F) a laundromat, dry-cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe
repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer,
pharmacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital,
or other service establishment;
(G) a terminal, depot, or other station used for specified public transportation;
(H) a museum, library, gallery, or other place of public display or collection;
(I) a park, zoo, amusement park, or other place of recreation;
(J) a nursery, elementary, secondary, undergraduate, or postgraduate private
school, or other place of education;
(K) a day care center, senior citizen center, homeless shelter, food bank, adoption
agency, or other social service center establishment; and
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examples of places of public accommodation are inns, motels, restau-
rants, theaters, lecture halls, dry cleaners, banks, zoos, schools, homeless
shelters, and golf courses.34 If a private entity is a place of public
accommodation, then the “general prohibition” clause of the ADA
mandates that any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates
the entity cannot discriminate against individuals with disabilities “in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations” of the entity.35 Moreover, in certain
instances the ADA also prohibits specific types of discrimination and
mandates explicit affirmative actions on the part of the place of public
accommodation.36 For example, places of public accommodation have
an affirmative duty to make reasonable modifications to their policies,
practices, or procedures and to provide auxiliary aids and services, if
necessary, to accommodate the needs of individuals with disabilities.37
Also, places of public accommodation must not impose requirements
tending to exclude individuals with disabilities from the full enjoyment
of the public accomodation’s goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations.38 The affirmative responsibilities of
a place of public accommodation are typically limited by a “reasonable-
ness” standard; that is, an action does not need to be taken if it would
cause an undue burden or fundamentally alter the nature of the good or
service offered by the entity.39




35. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The full provision reads: “No individual shall be discriminat-
ed against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation
by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”
Id.
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), (iii).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i). Also included in the statutory examples of specific
types of discrimination is that places of public accommodation cannot erect architectural,
communication, and transportation barriers. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Although the
prohibition on communication barriers may apply to the Internet (an argument asserted
by the National Federation of the Blind in its lawsuit against AOL, see Taylor, supra note
9, at 32), this Article does not assert that this prohibition applies, because the provision
limits its application to communication barriers “that are structural in nature.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), (iii).
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B. Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co.
Prior to 2002, at least two lawsuits alleged ADA claims based upon
the Internet. The first was brought by the National Federation for the
Blind, which alleged that America Online (“AOL”), an Internet service
provider, was a place of public accommodation that did not make itself
accessible to blind people.40 This lawsuit was settled by AOL shortly
after it was initiated, with AOL agreeing to make the next version of its
Internet software accessible to the blind.41 The second lawsuit was
filed against a company operating a website that provided an online
bridge tournament.42 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the website
cancelled his membership because the plaintiff was disabled.43 In an
unpublished opinion, the district court held that Title III of the ADA did
not apply to the company because it provided its services over the
Internet rather than at a physical place.44 On appeal the Fifth Circuit
upheld the district court’s dismissal of the case but upon grounds that
did not address whether Title III applied to Internet websites.45 Thus
neither of these cases provides much assistance in resolving whether
Title III applies to the Internet.
In October 2002, however, the Southern District of Florida directly
addressed this issue. In Access Now, plaintiffs contended that the
Internet website for Southwest Airlines, southwest.com, violated the
ADA because it was inaccessible to blind persons. Southwest’s website
provided consumers with a variety of services, including checking airline
fares and schedules and booking airline, hotel, and car reservations.46
The website, however, was alleged to be inaccessible to blind persons
using a screen reader because the site “fails to provide ‘alternative text’
which would provide a ‘screen reader’ program the ability to communi-
cate via synthesized speech what is visually displayed on the web-
site.”47 Plaintiffs in Access Now asserted that Title III of the ADA
40. See Taylor, supra note 9, at 32.
41. Id.
42. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, at 7, Hooks
v. OKBridge, Inc., No. 99-214, slip op. at 7 (W.D. Tex. June 28, 1999) (No. 99-50891),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/briefs/hooks.htm.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 7-8.
45. See Hooks v. OKBridge, 232 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2000); Position Paper, supra note
15, at 16 (noting that “the case added little to the law,” because the Fifth Circuit declined
to follow the district court’s reasoning regarding the scope of Title III).
46. 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1314-15.
47. Id. at 1316 (quoting Complaint ¶ 11). The issues raised in the court’s opinion were
brought before the court by Southwest’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
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should apply to southwest.com because it is a place of “ ‘exhibition,
display and a sales establishment.’ ”48 As the court acknowledged, this
argument is based on “language from three separate statutory subsec-
tions”49 within the definition of “place of public accommodation” set
forth in Title III.50 Moreover, based upon a decision from the First
Circuit that applied Title III to a health-benefit plan, plaintiffs argued
that the ADA should not be limited to physical structures.51
The court, however, determined that Title III did not apply to Internet
websites.52 First, the court examined the plain language of the ADA
and found that it does not include Internet websites among the
definitions of “places of public accommodation.”53 Thus, the court
utilized a strict, textualist approach to reject plaintiffs’ attempt to
combine terms from separate parts of the definition because, as the court
asserted, it “must view these general terms in the specific context in
which Congress placed each of them.”54 Second, the court determined
that the ADA required a physical structure, and the Internet was not a
physical place.55 Third, the court attempted to utilize the nexus
approach by determining that plaintiffs did not establish a nexus
between the travel service provided on southwest.com and a physical
concrete place of public accommodation.56 Although this Article agrees
with the first two holdings of the court in Access Now, as discussed
below, this Article disagrees with its application of the nexus approach.
C. The National Council on Disability Position Paper
In July 2003, the NCD released a position paper in which it analyzed
the question of whether Title III of the ADA applies to the Internet.57
The NCD concluded that the ADA should apply to Internet websites
generally, regardless of whether a particular website has a connection
to a physical place, because the Internet has become an integral part of
society.58 Individuals with disabilities should not be excluded from
which meant that the court accepted plaintiffs’ allegations as true. Id.
48. Id. at 1318 (quoting Complaint ¶ 9).
49. Id.
50. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C), (H), & (E)).
51. See id. at 1319 (citing Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Assoc.
of New England, 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994)).
52. Id. at 1321.
53. Id. at 1318.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1321.
56. Id. at 1319.
57. See generally Position Paper, supra note 15, at 11-26.
58. Id.
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fully participating in the benefits brought by this new technology.59 In
reaching this conclusion, the NCD identified the broad remedial purpose
of the ADA as a “compelling” reason to apply the ADA to the Internet.60
The NCD also examined and ultimately rejected the nexus approach and
its possible application to the Internet.61 The NCD asserted:
With the passage of time, as more and more goods, services, informa-
tional resources, recreation, communication, social and interactive
activities of all kind migrate, wholly or partly, to the Net, maintenance
of legal distinctions among otherwise similar Web sites, based on their
connection or lack of connection to a physical facility, will become
increasingly untenable and incoherent.62
The NCD addressed several hypothetical situations to argue that the
nexus approach would lead to inconsistent results.63 For example, the
NCD noted that, under the nexus approach, an online grocery store with
customer pickup points may be regulated by the ADA, but an online
grocery store that delivers directly to a customer’s home might not.64
Even more threatening to the NCD, if Internet-only websites are
excluded from coverage under Title III because they lack a nexus to a
physical place, then it may logically follow that “telephone, postal or any
other form of nonface-to-face interaction or commerce” might not be
covered.65 Furthermore, the NCD asserted broadly that requiring a
nexus to a physical place is not a satisfactory resolution of this issue
because “[o]nly a clear recognition of the seamlessness of commerce,
entertainment, education and health care makes any legal, economic or
administrative sense.”66
In other words, the NCD rejected both the court’s restrictive textual
approach in Access Now as well as the nexus approach proposed by this
Article.67 In so doing the NCD relied on both “purposivism” arguments,
relating to the broad purpose of the ADA, as well as practical arguments
59. Id.
60. Id. at 4 (“A statute with the broad ameliorative purposes of the ADA, if it is not to
be rendered a mockery, must possess the capacity and flexibility to cover those functions,
services and activities on the Web that are identical in purpose and outcome to those that
are expressly covered when provided in person.”).
61. See id. at 25-26.
62. Id. at 25.
63. Id. at 24-26.
64. Id. at 25 (noting that the nexus approach may “result in far more havoc than even
the most sweeping and inclusive requirement for across-the-board commercial Web site
accessibility ever could.”).
65. Id. at 25-26.
66. Id. at 26.
67. See Id. at 19-22, 24-26.
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regarding the extensive role of the Internet in society’s economic life and
the apparent inconsistency of applying the ADA to some businesses on
the Internet (those with physical facilities) but not others.68 Ultimately
the NCD called for the term “place” to be reconceptualized, because
cyberspace is not only recognized as a place but a place “where some of
the most dynamic and far-reaching initiatives in our society are taking
place. It is a place from which the law should countenance the exclusion
of no one.”69
Although NCD’s goal is admirable and worthy, as discussed below, it
does not justify ignoring the ADA’s statutory language and minimizing
Congress’s role in regulating new technologies. Moreover, the NCD’s
characterization of the potential inconsistencies of the nexus approach
neither fairly recognized the state of the law today nor properly
acknowledged the potential benefits of applying the ADA only to Internet
websites connected to a physical place of public accommodation.
III. THE ADA APPLIES TO WEBSITES THAT HAVE A NEXUS TO A
PHYSICAL PLACE OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION
Under the nexus approach, the ADA applies to some, but not all,
websites on the Internet. Contrary to the NCD position, this approach
accepts the court’s conclusion in Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines
Co.,70 that places of public accommodation must be physical places,
which excludes Internet websites in general from coverage under the
ADA. Contrary to the court’s ultimate holding in Access Now, however,
under the nexus analysis not all websites should be excluded from the
ADA’s reach. A website having a nexus to a physical place of public
accommodation should be regulated by the ADA because it provides
access to the goods and services of that place of public accommodation.
Unlike the more extreme positions of the court in Access Now and the
NCD, this conclusion best reflects the statutory language of the ADA
and demonstrates a better practical understanding of the nature of the
Internet.
A. The Nexus Approach
In contexts other than the Internet, courts have articulated a nexus
approach when discussing whether the ADA regulates a certain activity
or service. Under this analysis the ADA might apply to an activity or
service if a nexus exists between the challenged service and a physical
68. See id.
69. Id. at 26.
70. 227 F. Supp. 2d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
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place of public accommodation.71 Until Congress determines whether
to amend the ADA to clarify its applicability to the Internet, this limited
application of the ADA provides an appropriate solution to the debate.
1. The General Theory. In Rendon v. Valleycrest Products, Ltd.72
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the nexus approach
when addressing intangible forms of access to physical places of public
accommodation.73 In Rendon, hearing-impaired and mobility-impaired
individuals brought a class action complaint against the producers of the
television quiz show “Who Wants To Be A Millionaire.” Plaintiffs alleged
that the show’s process for choosing contestants unfairly screened out
individuals with hearing and mobility impairments because it relied
upon the speed with which a contestant could answer questions over the
telephone by pressing keys on a telephone keypad to indicate an-
swers.74 Defendants moved to dismiss the claims on the basis that the
ADA did not apply to the contestant hotline because the hotline was not
a physical barrier to entry erected by a public accommodation.75 The
Eleventh Circuit determined that this argument was “entirely unpersua-
sive”76 because the court considered the hotline an intangible barrier
to access to a public accommodation—the movie studio.77 According to
the court, the ADA covers:
both tangible barriers, that is, physical and architectural barriers that
would prevent a disabled person from entering an accommodation’s
facilities and accessing its goods, services and privileges, and intangible
barriers, such as eligibility requirements and screening rules or
71. See Rendon v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 294 F.3d 1279, 1284 n.8 (11th Cir. 2002).
72. 294 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2002).
73. Id. at 1284 n.8; see also Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104,
1114 (9th Cir. 2000).
74. The contestants for the show are selected through an automated telephone
answering system, whereby potential contestants call a toll-free number and answer a
series of questions. The potential contestants’ answers are recorded by pressing the
appropriate keys on their telephone keypads, which must be done quickly in order to
qualify. Callers who answer all of the questions correctly are then placed in a random
drawing for a second round, in which they answer another series of questions. Rendon, 294
F.3d at 1280. Plaintiffs in Rendon claimed this process was discriminatory “either because
they were deaf and could not hear the questions on the automated system, or because they
[were mobility impaired and] could not move their fingers rapidly enough to record their
answers on the telephone key pads.” Id. at 1280-81.
75. Id. at 1281, 1283. Defendants also asserted that the hotline itself was not a place
of public accommodation, an argument the Eleventh Circuit apparently did not reach. See
id.
76. Id. at 1283.
77. Id.
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discriminatory policies and procedures that restrict a disabled person’s
ability to enjoy the defendant entity’s goods, services and privileges.78
Thus the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the ADA provides protection
from discrimination that occurs off-site or over the telephone as long as
there is some connection, or nexus, between the activity and the
premises of a place of public accommodation.79 As summarized by the
NCD:
If asked to state the central point of the Eleventh Circuit’s Rendon
decision, it would have to be that “nexus” is the test of Title III’s
application to off-site, nonphysical actions and procedures. If the
screening mechanism or practice has a connection to the public
accommodation, that is, if it actually constitutes a barrier to access by
people with disabilities, it will be covered by Title III . . . .80
Courts have utilized the nexus concept in various contexts. For
example the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have required a nexus
between insurance sold to individuals and a physical insurance office.81
Other courts have determined that a private membership organization
can constitute a place of public accommodation only if it has a “close
nexus” to a specific facility.82 Indeed the NCAA was found to be a place
of public accommodation because of its close connection to stadiums and
arenas,83 but the Boy Scouts was not because it only conducted
meetings of small groups, primarily in private homes.84 Similarly in
Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network,85 a case brought under comparable
78. Id. (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 1284 n.8.
80. Position Paper, supra note 15, at 18.
81. See Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v.
MetroLife Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1011 (6th Cir. 1997); Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000). In Ford, Parker, and Weyer, the nexus
requirement was not satisfied because the insurance was provided through the plaintiffs’
employer, not directly through the insurance company. Ford, 145 F.3d at 613; Parker, 121
F.3d at 1011; Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115.
82. Ganden v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 96 C 6953, 1996 WL 680000 at *10
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1996) (citing two part nexus test: (1) the organization is affiliated with
a particular facility, and (2) membership in the organization acts as a necessary predicate
to use of that particular facility); Welsh v. Boy Scouts of Am., 993 F.2d 1267, 1270 (7th Cir.
1993) (finding that the Boy Scouts did not have sufficient nexus to a place of public
accommodation under a similar provision of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Elitt
v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 223 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
83. See, e.g., Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *10; see also Matthews v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1223 (E.D. Wash. 2001); Tatum v. Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n, 992 F. Supp. 1114, 1119-21 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
84. Ganden, 1996 WL 680000, at *10 (citing Welsh, 993 F.2d at 1274).
85. 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 1994).
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language in Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Ninth Circuit
determined a nonprofit organization that provided information to the
public concerning cults was not a place of public accommodation because
plaintiff did not allege facts establishing that the organization sold goods
and services from any public facility.86 Finally, the Third Circuit
recognized that denial of hospital privileges to a doctor because of the
doctor’s disability might violate the ADA because of the “nexus between
the services or privileges denied and the physical place of the hospital
as a public accommodation.”87 Thus courts have used the nexus
approach to link the types of discrimination prohibited by the ADA with
the places of public accommodation regulated by the statute.
2. Application of the Nexus Approach to the Internet. When
courts and commentators have examined whether to apply the ADA to
Internet websites, the nexus approach was either misapplied,88 unfairly
criticized,89 or simply overlooked.90 This treatment is undeserved
because the nexus requirement provides a solution to this issue that not
only fairly treats the language and purpose of the ADA but also
realistically recognizes the nature of the Internet.
The nexus approach requires Internet websites of physical places of
public accommodation to be accessible to disabled individuals because of
a website’s close connection to the business of a place of public accommo-
dation. Under this analysis, the Internet is best viewed as a means for
a place of public accommodation to provide access to its goods and
services for, and to communicate with, its customers and clients.
Websites are an integral part of a business’s communication, advertising,
and sales efforts, and if an entity is covered by the ADA as a place of
public accommodation, the ADA regulates how that covered entity
conducts its business and communicates with its customers. In the
words of the statute itself, the ADA regulates the covered entity’s “goods,
services, . . . privileges, [or] advantages,”91 a listing of activities in
which it seems reasonable to include communications and sales through
86. Id. at 756; see also Schaaf v. Ass’n Educ. Therapists, No. C 94-03315 CW, 1995 WL
381979, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 1995) (holding that organization must have connection
to a particular place of public accommodation).
87. Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting
Ford, 145 F.3d at 613) (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. See Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1319-21.
89. See Position Paper, supra note 15, at 24-26.
90. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 97 (testimony of Elizabeth K. Dorminey) (arguing
that ADA does not apply to private websites but not discussing whether the nexus
requirement could make the ADA applicable).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
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an entity’s website. Moreover, the statute and the regulations specifical-
ly mandate that places of public accommodation furnish “auxiliary aids
and services” when necessary to ensure effective communication with
individuals with disabilities, unless doing so would result in a funda-
mental alteration to the program or service or an undue burden.92 The
regulations recognize that auxiliary aids can include qualified interpret-
ers, videotext displays, computer-aided transcription services, written
materials, braille materials, audio recordings, or large print materials.93
Given such a broad range of aids and services, it is reasonable to
conclude that auxiliary aids should include alternative manners of
reading a website provided by a place of public accommodation.94
Simply put, if a place is a covered entity—a physical place of public
accommodation—then under the nexus analysis, the ADA requires that
the entity provide its goods, services, and communications, which likely
include Internet communications, in a nondiscriminatory and accessible
manner.
An example of the type of analysis that should be used when applying
the nexus approach to an Internet website can be found in Walker v.
Carnival Cruise Lines.95 In Walker a travel agency sold disabled
customers tickets on a cruise that was not disabled accessible. The
customers filed a claim under Title III against the travel agency for
failing to adequately research and for misrepresenting the accessibility
of the cruise line.96 The court viewed the claim based upon the travel
agency’s failure to modify or adjust its services to meet the needs of the
disabled customers it serves.97 As framed by the court: “Travel agents
fall squarely within the ADA’s definition of public accommodations. The
question is whether, quite apart from the physical accessibility of the
Travel Agent’s office, the ADA also covers the disabled accessibility of
the services these agents provide.”98 The court answered this question
affirmatively, because providing travel information is the primary
92. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 (2003); 28 C.F.R. § 35.160 (2003).
93. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b).
94. Indeed, this position was taken in 1996 by Deval Patrick, then the Assistant
Attorney General of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, in an opinion
letter issued to Senator Tom Harkin. Letter from Deval Patrick, Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Rights Division, to Tom Harkin, Senator (Sept. 9, 1996), at http://www.usdoj
.gov/crt/foia/tal712.txt [hereinafter Letter]. Mr. Patrick did not discuss whether a covered
entity would be limited to physical places or could be interpreted to include websites with
no connection to a physical place of public accommodation. Id.
95. 63 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
96. Id. at 1086, 1091. Plaintiffs filed claims against the cruise line as well. Id. at 1086.
97. Id. at 1092.
98. Id.
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“service” offered by travel agents: “[I]nadequate or inaccurate informa-
tion regarding the disabled accessibility of travel accommodations for
disabled travelers deprives them of equal access to or ‘full and equal
enjoyment of ’ travel information services.”99 Similar to the travel
services provided by the agency in Walker, the information provided on
websites of places of public accommodation also can be deemed a service
required to be provided in a nondiscriminatory manner by places of
public accommodation.100 Providing accessible websites is simply
another means of providing individuals with disabilities equal access to
the goods and services of places of public accommodation.101
At the same time, however, the nexus approach would not apply to
websites without a connection to a physical place of public accommoda-
tion because the fairest reading of the statutory and regulatory language
of the ADA is that a place of public accommodation must be a physical
place. Given the “virtual” nature of the Internet, websites in general
would not qualify on their own as places of public accommodation unless
they were connected to a physical facility. The distinction between
websites connected to a physical place of public accommodation and
those not connected is best explained by an examination of the statutory
language of the ADA.
B. The Nexus Approach Best Reflects the Language of the ADA
Two different statutory provisions of the ADA justify the nexus
approach. First, the argument that places of public accommodation must
be “physical” places is based on the statutory and regulatory definitions
of “place of public accommodation,” which provide a specific listing of
covered places that are all physical locations. Second, the argument that
websites of those physical places are regulated by the ADA is based upon
the broad definitions of “discrimination” found in the statute. Thus the
first aspect of the nexus approach is based upon a narrow interpretation
of which entities must comply with the ADA, and the second part
involves a broad understanding of the type of activity prohibited by the
statute. The statutory authority for each of these parts of the nexus
approach will be discussed in turn.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Carparts Dist. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s of New England Inc., 37 F.3d
12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that by drafting Title III of the ADA, “Congress intended that
people with disabilities have equal access to the array of goods and services offered by
private establishments and made available to those who do not have disabilities.”).
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1. Internet Websites Are Not Places of Public Accommoda-
tion. In order for the ADA to apply generally to all websites on the
Internet, either the websites or the Internet must be considered places
of public accommodation.102 An analysis of this issue should begin
with the language of the statute itself.103 The term “place of public
accommodation” is specifically defined by the ADA to include limited
types of private entities if the operation of such entities affects com-
merce.104 Notably, neither the ADA nor its regulations specifically
refer to the Internet or websites.105 The Internet barely existed when
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990. Thus any Congressional intent to
apply the ADA specifically to the Internet seems speculative at best.106
Moreover the types of examples set forth in the ADA’s definition of
place of public accommodation—places such as museums, libraries,
theaters, bakeries, and bowling alleys107—indicate that Congress
intended Title III of the ADA to apply only to actual physical concrete
structures, not virtual places such as websites.108 This conclusion
results from the application of two canons of statutory construction.
First, pursuant to the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, any ambiguous
words in the statute should be interpreted by reference to the accompa-
nying words of the statute in order “ ‘to avoid the giving of unintended
breadth to the Acts of Congress.’ ”109 Accordingly, to the extent terms
in the definition of public accommodation such as “travel service”110 or
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2000).
103. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997) (“Our first step in interpreting
a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous
meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.”).
104. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000); 28 C.F.R. § 36.102 (2003).
105. See Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.
106. See Konkright, supra note 7, at 714-15; Maroney, supra note 7, at 198-99 (“[T]he
Internet was simply not a part of mainstream life in 1990. Its rapid growth was
unforeseen by lawmakers even a decade ago. The Internet’s absence from the original
debate over the ADA thus raises serious issues of statutory interpretation.”).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000).
108. See, e.g., Weyer 198 F.3d at 1114-16; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1014 (holding that “[t]he
clear connotation of the words in § 12181(7) is that a public accommodation is a physical
place,” because “[e]very term listed in § 12181(7) . . . is a physical place open to public
access”); Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. But see Carparts, 37 F.3d at 18-20 (holding
that trade association that administers a health insurance program can be a place of public
accommodation even if it does not have any connection to a physical facility).
109. Ford, 145 F.3d at 614 (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307,
(1961)); see also Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114 (utilizing the principle of noscitur a sociis to
interpret the statutory definition of “place of public accommodation”).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (2000).
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“public display”111 are thought to be ambiguous (and therefore could
arguably include Internet websites), these terms should be examined in
light of the other types of words in the statute. For example, “travel
service” is listed along with other plainly physical structures, such as a
laundromat, dry-cleaner, barber and beauty shops, funeral parlor, gas
station, and offices of various professionals.112 Similarly the term
“public display” is listed along with buildings such as a museum and a
library.113 Therefore, under this doctrine, the context of the words in
the statutory definition of place of public accommodation suggests that
“an actual physical place is required.”114
Second, the rule of ejusdem generis requires that “where the general
words follow a specific enumeration of persons or things, the general
words should be limited to persons or things similar to those specifically
enumerated.”115 The court in Access Now specifically relied on this
canon of statutory interpretation to reject plaintiffs’ argument that
Internet websites could be included in such general terms as “ ‘other
place of exhibition or entertainment,’ ”116 “ ‘other place of public display
or collection,’”117 and “ ‘other sales or rental establishment.’”118 As
acknowledged by the court, these general terms “are limited to their
corresponding specifically enumerated terms, all of which are physical,
concrete structures, namely: ‘motion picture house, theater, concert hall,
stadium,’ [and] ‘museum, library, gallery,’ and ‘bakery, grocery store,
clothing store, hardware store, shopping center,’ respectively.”119 Of
the examples cited by the statute as places of public accommodation,
none reasonably can be said, on their face, to include establishments
that offer goods and services to the public solely through nonphysical
means, such as a mail order magazine business, over-the-phone
operations, or Internet websites.120 Although the examples do contain
some general, catch-all terms that may encompass these entities, the
statute makes clear that Congress either did not contemplate nonphysi-
cal establishments as places of public accommodation or consciously
111. Id. § 12181(7)(H).
112. Id. § 12181(7)(F).
113. Id. § 12181(7)(H).
114. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114.
115. Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318 (quoting Allen v. A.G. Thomas, 161 F.3d 667,
671 (11th Cir. 1998)) (citation omitted).
116. Id. at 1317 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C) (2000)).
117. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(H)).
118. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E)).
119. Id. at 1319 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(C), (H), & (E)).
120. See Konkright, supra note 7, at 723.
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chose to exclude nonphysical facilities from its list.121 Indeed, applying
well-founded canons of statutory interpretation such as noscitur a sociis
and ejusdem generis permits the judiciary to rely on the language
actually used by Congress rather than extrapolating what Congress may
have meant had Congress thought about the Internet.122 Therefore, a
court that limits itself to the plain wording of the ADA would find it
difficult to conclude that Congress intended for virtual places, such as
Internet websites, to be included along with the physical structures
specifically set out in the statute.
In addition to the limitations of the statutory language, the regula-
tions promulgated by the attorney general shed further light on the
types of entities covered by the ADA.123 The ADA’s regulations define
a place of public accommodation as a “facility, operated by a private
entity, whose operations affect commerce and fall within at least one of
the [twelve enumerated categories set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 12181-
(7)124].”125 The regulations subsequently use concrete, physical terms
to define “facility” as “all or any portion of buildings, structures, sites,
complexes, equipment, rolling stock or other conveyances, roads, walks,
passageways, parking lots, or other real or personal property, including
the site where the building, property, structure, or equipment is
located.”126 As noted by several courts and commentators, this
regulatory language supports an interpretation of the ADA’s statutory
language to limit places of public accommodation to actual, physical
structures.127 Moreover, given the direct statutory authority of the
121. See Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19-20 (stating that “[o]ne who simply reads the
Committee Report describing the operations of Title III could easily come away with the
impression that it is primarily concerned with access in the sense of . . . physical access
. . . .”).
122. See Konkright, supra note 7, at 723-34. One commentator notes that the
legislative history also indicates that Congress did not intend for a broad interpretation of
a place of public accommodation because in the version of Title III submitted by the
Senate, the definition of “public accommodation” included “other similar places” to those
enumerated, but that “this language was written out by the House of Representatives
before adopting the current definition.” Id. at 723 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-596, at
20 (1990)). Konkright also notes that the House stated that the enumerated categories of
public accommodations are “intended to be exhaustive and that an entity excluded from
this list . . . is not considered a place of public accommodation.” Id. at 723-24.
123. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2003).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000).
125. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (emphasis added).
126. Id.
127. Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318; Torres v. AT&T Broadband, LLC, 158 F.
Supp. 2d 1035, 1038 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding that a digital cable system was not a place
of public accommodation); Brown v. 1995 Tenet ParaAm. Bicycle Challenge, 959 F. Supp.
496, 498 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that operators of a bicycle tour were not a place of public
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Attorney General to issue regulations interpreting the ADA,128 this
regulatory language should be given deference.129 Notably, the
Department of Justice has not attempted to issue new regulations to
alter its definition of place of public accommodation or to unambiguously
apply the ADA to private Internet websites.130
Courts have used the type of strict statutory construction set forth
above to hold that a broad range of nonphysical entities should not be
considered places of public accommodation because of their lack of
physicality, such as television broadcasts,131 digital cable systems,132
insurance policies,133 membership organizations,134 youth hockey
leagues,135 and newspaper columns.136 Similarly, in response to
plaintiffs’ assertion seeking “equal access to Southwest’s virtual ‘ticket
counters’ as they exist on-line,”137 the court in Access Now determined
that the Internet was not a physical place of public accommodation.138
The court first relied substantially upon the statutory and regulatory
language of the ADA to conclude that a public accommodation must be
a physical, concrete structure.139 Then, the court held that the Inter-
net was not a physical place because, citing to the Supreme Court and
the Eleventh Circuit, the court determined the Internet to be “a unique
accommodation and noting that most courts “have read the word ‘facility’ literally,
concluding that the focus of a claim under Title III of the ADA must be ‘the place of public
accommodation.’ ” (citing Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583
(6th Cir. 1995))); Konkright, supra note 7, at 717; Maroney, supra note 7, at 197-98.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12186(b) (2000).
129. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45
(1984) (holding that courts must give deference to formal agency regulations construing
statutory provisions, unless those regulations constitute an impermissible interpretation
of the statute).
130. Interestingly, though, the Department of Justice has taken the position in court
pleadings that the ADA should apply to private Internet websites. See Brief of the United
States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Hooks v. OKBridge, Inc., No. 99-214, slip
op. at 7 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 1999) (No. 99-50891), available at www.usdoj.gov/crt/
briefs/hooks.htm.
131. See Stoutenborough v. Nat’l Football League, Inc., 59 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 1995).
132. See Torres, 158 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
133. See, e.g., Ford, 145 F.3d at 612-13; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1010-11.
134. See Brown, 959 F. Supp. at 498.
135. See Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 223 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
136. Treanor v. Wash. Post Co., 826 F. Supp. 568, 569 (D.D.C. 1993).
137. Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (citations omitted).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1318 (rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that southwest.com falls within the plain
language of 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) because it is a place of “exhibition, display and a sales
establishment”). The court also determined that no “ ‘nexus’ [existed] between south-
west.com and a physical, concrete place of public accommodation.” Id. at 1321; see infra
Part III(D)(1).
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medium—known to its users as ‘cyberspace’—located in no particular
geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world,
with access to the Internet.”140 Because the website did not exist in
“any particular geographic location,”141 plaintiffs were not impeded
from access to “a specific, physical, concrete space such as a particular
airline ticket counter or travel agency.”142 Thus the court in Access
Now rejected plaintiffs’ claim that the ADA applied to Southwest’s
Internet website.
In Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc.,143 this same issue was addressed
but in the context of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.144 Title
II of the Civil Rights Act contains a definition of “place of public
accommodation” analogous to the definition under the ADA.145 In
Noah, a Muslim subscriber to America Online’s Internet service asserted
a claim that AOL permitted harassing language based upon his religion
to be displayed in one of AOL’s “chat rooms.”146 A chat room, as
described by the court in Noah, permits participants to engage in real-
time electronic conversations over the Internet.147 In determining
whether such chat rooms were places of public accommodation, the court
followed the logic set forth above and determined, after a lengthy
discussion of statutory interpretation and case law from both the Civil
Rights Act and the ADA, that a place of public accommodation must be
a physical place.148 Following this detailed analysis, the court held
that, because it is “firmly established” that places of public accommoda-
tion must be “actual physical facilities . . . it is clear that AOL’s online
chat rooms cannot be construed as ‘places of public accommodation’
140. Id. at 1321 (quoting Voyeur Dorm, L.C. v. City of Tampa, 265 F.3d 1232, 1237 n.3
(11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted)).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. 261 F. Supp. 2d 532 (E.D. Va. 2003).
144. Id. at 534; 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a).
146. 261 F. Supp. 2d at 534-35.
147. Id. at 535, 536. As noted by the court:
Chat room participants type in their comments or observations, which are then
read by other chat room participants, who may then type in their responses.
Conversations in a chat room unfold in real time; the submitted comments appear
transiently on participants’ screens and then scroll off the screen as the
conversation progresses. AOL chat rooms are typically set up for the discussion
of a particular topic or area of interest, and any AOL member who wishes to join
a conversation in a public chat room may do so.
Id.
148. Id. at 541-46.
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under Title II.”149 Like the court in Access Now, the court in Noah
relied upon the Internet’s virtual nature and the conclusion that, unlike
a theater, concert hall, or arena, an Internet chat room “does not exist
in a particular physical location[;] indeed it can be accessed almost
anywhere, including from homes, schools, cybercafes and libraries.”150
According to the court, this lack of permanent location belies metaphori-
cal references to an Internet forum as a “location” or “place” and requires
the conclusion that an Internet chat room is not a place of public
accommodation.151
Therefore, requiring a place of public accommodation to be a physical
place disqualifies the Internet generally. As discussed below, however,
physical places of public accommodation communicate with, and provide
access to their goods and services through, their Internet website. This
connection between the website and a physical place of public accommo-
dation permits regulation by the ADA of these specific websites.
2. Prohibited Discrimination Under the ADA Includes Lack of
Accessibility to the Websites of Places of Public Accommoda-
tion. Although limited to physical places, the ADA prohibits more than
barriers to physical access to those places. Indeed the ADA has both
general and specific prohibitions on discrimination by covered entities,
and both prohibitions support the nexus approach and its application to
nonphysical barriers to access physical places.152 First, the ADA
broadly prohibits discrimination in “the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation. . . .”153 This prohibition is intri-
cately connected to the business of the place of public accommodation;
indeed, the “goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations”154 referenced in the general rule are not “free-
standing concepts but rather all refer to the statutory term ‘public
accommodation’ and thus to what these places of public accommodation
provide.”155
Second, in addition to the general definition of discrimination, the
ADA specifically defines “discrimination” to prohibit several different
149. Id. at 544.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 544-45.
152. See Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1114 (noting that the context of the statutory language
“suggests that some connection between the good or service complained of and an actual
physical place is required”).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. Ford, 145 F.3d at 613.
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types of nonphysical activity and behavior, including, among other
things: (1) imposing eligibility criteria that screen out an individual
with a disability; (2) failing to make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford
such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations
to individuals with disabilities; and (3) failing to provide auxiliary aids
and services when they are necessary for an individual with a disability
to realize the full benefit of a place of public accommodation.156 As
noted by the Eleventh Circuit in Rendon, the ADA’s specific examples of
discrimination cover both physical architectural barriers157 and
intangible barriers, such as eligibility requirements, discriminatory
policies and procedures, or a failure to provide “a reasonable auxiliary
service that would permit the disabled to gain access to or use its goods
and services.”158 Of particular importance in the Internet context, the
ADA regulations mandate that public accommodations shall furnish
appropriate auxiliary aids and services to ensure “[e]ffective communica-
tion . . . with individuals with disabilities,”159 a requirement that does
not rely only upon physical access.160
In addition to the language of the discrimination provisions, Congress
specifically meant for the ADA to apply to more than physical barriers.
In the ADA’s Findings of Fact, Congress noted that “individuals with
disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination,
including outright intentional exclusion, [and] the discriminatory effects
of architectural, transportation, and communication barriers. . . .”161
Congress also meant for the ADA to cover more than individuals with
physical impairments; protecting only physical access ignores that the
ADA protects people with mental impairments, individuals with records
of impairments, and people “regarded as” having an impairment.162
Failing to address intangible barriers to access would result in a
situation in which, for example, protections of individuals with mental
impairments would be “virtually negated.”163 Thus the language of the
156. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii).
157. 294 F.3d at 1283 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)).
158. Id. at 1283 n.7 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i), (ii), (iii)).
159. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c) (2003).
160. Id.
161. Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1286 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2000)).
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)-(B) (2000) (defining “disability” to include a “physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
such individual; a record of such impairment; or being regarded as having such an
impairment”).
163. Winslow v. IDS Life Ins. Co., 29 F. Supp. 2d 557, 562-63 (D. Minn. 1998); see also
Kotev v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 927 F. Supp. 1316, 1321-22 (C.D. Cal. 1996).
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ADA does not limit the definition of “discrimination” only to physical
barriers inhibiting physical access to a place of public accommoda-
tion.164
Under the nexus approach, then, a connection must exist between a
physical place of public accommodation and the discriminatory action or
inaccessible service. This connection, however, is not limited only to
whether an individual with a disability can physically access a place of
public accommodation. By referencing discriminatory actions taken with
regard to a broad range of activities of a public accommodation, in
addition to the accommodation’s facilities, the statutory text indicates
that the connection simply must be toward some aspect of the place of
public accommodation’s offerings to the public. The nexus can involve
both tangible and intangible discriminatory actions, including refusing
to provide auxiliary aids to ensure effective communication or failing to
make reasonable modifications in policies or procedures to provide an
individual with a disability full use of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommo-
dation.165 In other words, the ADA will not countenance discrimina-
tion, as defined both generally and specifically by the statute and the
regulations, even if it occurs off-site and away from the actual physical
place of public accommodation.166 This broad definition of discrimina-
tion is the essence of the nexus approach because it prevents discrimina-
tion in a variety of aspects of a covered entity’s business.167
Reliance on the broad definition of discrimination, however, should not
be taken too far by asserting that the ADA ought to apply to all websites
on the Internet, regardless of their connection to a physical place of
public accommodation. Applying the ADA to the Internet generally
would bring a new group of entities under the auspices of the ADA—In-
ternet websites with no connection to a physical place of public
accommodation—with little statutory authority. By applying the ADA
only to the websites of physical places of public accommodation, the
nexus approach ensures that entities already covered by the statute
164. See Walker, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1093.
165. See Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1283.
166. See id. at 1285; see also Petruzzelli, supra note 2, at 1080 n.112. Although
Petruzzelli argued for broad applicability of the ADA to the Internet, he also recognized
that even if a place of public accommodation was interpreted only to include physical
places, “it does not necessarily mean that Title III only applies to physical access to these
places. Not being able to effectively get into a store is not the only form of discrimination.”
Petruzzelli, supra note 2, at 1080 n.112.
167. In Rendon, for example, the off-site telephone hotline was considered an intangible
barrier to entry to the physical studio, which was a place of public accommodation itself.
294 F.3d at 1283.
2004] THE ADA IN CYBERSPACE 987
simply comply with their current obligations, regardless of the medium
in which they communicate with the public.
In summary, the narrow language of the definition of “place of public
accommodation” justifies a limitation of places of public accommodation
to physical places. At the same time, the broad language of the
antidiscrimination provisions of the ADA requires these covered entities
to ensure the accessibility of their websites.168 The nexus approach,
then, most accurately reflects the ADA’s broad application to a specifical-
ly defined group of covered entities.
C. The Nexus Approach Best Reflects the Nature of the Internet
The nexus approach also provides the best interpretation of the ADA
when considering the nature of the Internet. As set forth below, the
Internet should not be considered a place, either physically or metaphor-
ically. Moreover, the nexus approach best addresses the unique medium
of the Internet in that not only can a website provide access to goods or
services but also, in many cases, a website actually is the good or service
delivered to the public by a company.
1. The Internet is Not a Physical or Metaphoric Place. In
response to the assertion that the ADA applies only to physical places
of public accommodation, commentators assert that the Internet should
qualify as an actual physical place.169 One version of this argument
focuses on the word “equipment” in the regulatory definition of
“facility.”170 Under this rationale, the servers on which websites run
may be regarded as equipment, and those servers are located at physical
places.171 Thus because websites provide their goods and services from
equipment in places that are owned or leased by public accommodations,
the websites themselves should qualify as places of public accommoda-
tion.172 Another version of the argument is that websites should be
construed as their name implies—as “sites”—and therefore should be
considered facilities as defined by the regulations.173 The website, a
168. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000) (providing definition of “public accommoda-
tion”), with 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000) (providing general rule against discrimination “on
the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation”).
169. See Position Paper, supra note 15, at 24-25; Dana Whitehead McKee & Deborah
T. Fleishaker, ADA and the Internet: Must Websites Be Accessible, 33 MD. BAR J. 34, 35
(Nov.-Dec. 2000).
170. See Position Paper, supra note 15, at 24-25 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2003)).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. McKee & Fleishaker, supra note 169, at 34.
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group of related documents sharing the same address on the Web,174
is stored in a physical place that is either owned or leased by an
entity.175
Both versions of this “physical place” argument, however, are
undermined by the analysis in two cases addressing intangible forms of
communication analogous to the Internet: A digital cable system and a
television broadcast. First, in Torres v. AT&T Broadband, LLC,176 a
district court held that a digital cable system cannot be considered a
place of public accommodation because viewing the system’s images did
not require access to “any actual physical public place.”177 In Torres,
plaintiff asserted (much like the argument set forth above) that the
digital cable system’s equipment should be considered a facility.178
This assertion, however, was flatly rejected by the district court because
viewing the images from the system did not require gaining access to a
physical public place.179 The court in Torres noted:
The defendants’ digital cable system is installed in the plaintiff ’s home.
The plaintiff does not have to travel to some physical place, open to the
public, in order to experience the benefits of the defendants’ digital
cable system. He simply turns on his television set and has automatic
access to the sounds and images provided by the defendants’ ser-
vice.180
Second, in Stoutenborough v National Football League, Inc.,181 the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the television broadcast of a professional
football game could not be considered a place of public accommodation
because it was not a physical place.182 In that case an association of
hearing impaired individuals sought to overturn the National Football
League’s “blackout rule” prohibiting the live local broadcast of home
football games that are not sold out seventy-two hours before game time.
Plaintiffs contended that the rule discriminated against them because
they had no other means of accessing the football game “via telecommu-
174. Id. at 35 (citing Digital Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 459
n.2 (D. Mass 1997)).
175. Id.
176. 158 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
177. Id. at 1038. Plaintiff in Torres claimed that defendants’ cable system was required
by the ADA to make the channel on which defendants provide a list of available programs
(i.e., the channel menu) accessible to the visually impaired. Id. at 1036-37.
178. See id. at 1038.
179. See id.
180. Id.
181. 59 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 1995).
182. Id. at 583.
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nication technology.”183 The Sixth Circuit rejected this assertion and
held that the television service did not involve a place of public
accommodation.184
Thus, the courts in Torres and Stoutenborough neatly addressed the
NCD’s argument by holding that the ADA applies directly to physical
places that are open to the public.185 Rather than merely being
associated with some physical facility, the physical facility itself must be
open to the public.186 Neither the Internet, a digital cable system, nor
a television broadcast involve, as a general matter, physical places open
to the public; they all use physical facilities that are necessary to provide
services, but none of these facilities are open to the public in the same
way museums, motion picture houses, theaters, concert halls, and
stadiums identified by the ADA’s definition of place of public accommo-
dation are physically accessible to the public.187 In short, the Internet
should not be considered a physical place of public accommodation
simply because physical facilities (not open to the public) are used to
maintain the servers utilized by the Internet.
Metaphoric arguments also can be made to support the conclusion that
Title III should apply to Internet websites because we conceptualize the
Internet as a place.188 Lawrence Lessig, a well-regarded commentator
on the law’s applicability to the Internet, notes plainly that “[c]yberspace
is a place. People live there. They experience all the sorts of things that
they experience in real space, there.”189 As another commentator
described the phenomenon, “[T]he language that we use to discuss
cyberspace is shot through with physical references and implications
. . . . The physical world of stores, places, and roads was translated
online into an abstract space that shared all the spatial characteristics
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Torres, 158 F. Supp. at 1038; Stoutenborough, 59 F.3d at 583.
186. See, e.g., id.; Jankey v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 212 F.3d 1159, 1161
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a commissary, studio store, and automatic teller machine
(ATM) located on a movie studio’s production lot were not “public accommodations” subject
to the ADA, even if they fell within the ADA’s listed categories of private entities that
would be considered public accommodations, because the lot was not open to the public and
was restricted to employees and authorized business guests).
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (2000); see Maroney, supra note 7, at 194 (noting that
websites differ “dramatically” from the examples listed in the statute, because “websites
do not have tangible facilities”).
188. See Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons,
91 CAL. L. REV. 441, 445 (2003) (detailing different Internet-related legal domains, “where
judges, legislators, and practitioners have adopted the CYBERSPACE AS PLACE metaphor,
whether they realize it or not”).
189. Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1996).
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of the physical world.”190 People use words connoting physicality to
discuss navigating and utilizing the Internet, such as “surfing” the web,
“moving” from one “site” to the next, and “entering” a website.191 Such
metaphors and analogies pervade judicial opinions as well: In the same
case in which the Supreme Court implied that the Internet was not a
physical place because it did not have a particular geographic location,
the Court also analogized the Internet “to both a vast library including
millions of readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling
mall offering goods and services.”192 Of course a library and a mall
would be prototypical examples of places of public accommodation.193
Nevertheless, as several commentators note, the metaphor of the
Internet as a physical place has several weaknesses even though we
sometimes speak and think of the Internet in physical or spatial
terms.194 The Internet “is merely a simple computer protocol, a piece
of code that permits computer users to transmit data between their
computers using existing communications networks.”195 Although it
may be obvious, Internet users do not physically travel to various
websites.196 The user sends a request for information to a provider of
a website, and the provider sends back the data that makes up the web
page itself.197 Moreover, Internet users do not actually experience
events as they would in a physical place; the Internet is mainly text,
190. Hunter, supra note 188, at 458. As noted by one commentator:
[T]he Internet is often described in tangible “brick and mortar” terms. We now
commonly speak of chat rooms, an information super-highway, Internet
architectures, and web pages being “under construction.” All of these real-world
metaphors draw on the parallels between electronic space and the tangible world,
each capturing how similar e-space and real space can be.
Maroney, supra note 7, at 194.
191. See Hunter, supra note 188, at 453-54 (citing dozens of examples of “physical
vocabulary” used when describing online events and occurrences).
192. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E) & (H) (2000).
194. See Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 CAL. L. REV. 521, 523 (2003) (“As
a technical matter, of course, the idea that the Internet is literally a place in which people
travel is not only wrong but faintly ludicrous.”); Andrew L. Shapiro, The Disappearance of
Cyberspace and the Rise of Code, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 703, 704-11 (1998); Timothy
Wu, When Law & the Internet First Met, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 171, 171 (1999-2000) (noting that
the idea of cyberspace as a place “must count as among recent legal history’s more quixotic
episodes”).
195. Lemley, supra note 194, at 523; see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 849 (“The Internet is
an international network of interconnected computers.”).
196. Lemley, supra note 194, at 542.
197. Id.
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images, and sound.198 When viewed from this perspective, the Internet
seems more analogous to other communications systems—such as mail,
telephone calls, television, cable, and radio—than to a physical
place.199 As noted by one commentator, when we receive such
correspondence, we do not think that “we magically enter a store or a
friend’s house.”200 Ultimately metaphors should not trump statutory
language that limits applicability of the ADA to physical places and that
pre-dated the increased importance of the Internet.
Thus the very make-up of the Internet demonstrates that it is not a
physical place that can be visited by the public, even though we often
speak of the Internet in such metaphoric terms. It is likely that courts
will determine that a website, standing alone, is not a place of public
accommodation as defined by the ADA because it is not a physical place.
The analyses in Access Now, Noah, Stoutenborough, and Torres are
based upon the recognition that non-physical, communicative services
such as the Internet, a cable system, and a television broadcast are not
the types of activities generally regulated by the ADA.201
2. The Nexus Approach Reflects a Nuanced Understanding of
the Internet’s Simultaneous Substantive and Communicative
Roles. The ADA’s regulations make clear that the ADA requires access
to a place of public accommodation, but it does not require that the
public accommodation change the content of goods or services it
provides.202 The example in the regulations that explains this distinc-
tion is that a bookstore is required to provide access to, and sell books
to, a blind person, but is not required to stock a braille version of every
book in its inventory.203 This distinction between accessibility and
198. Id. at 524-25; Hearings, supra note 2, at 67 (testimony of Susyn Conway) (“The
Internet is not a physical structure, a ‘facility’ for which some general disability-serving
standards might be conceivable and applicable across the board—it is [an] assortment of
sometimes conflicting technologies, and business models in the trial-and-error mode.”);
Hearings, supra note 2, at 72 (testimony of Dennis Hayes) (“The Internet is an evolving
media, not a physical structure.”).
199. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 90, 96 (testimony of Elizabeth K. Dorminey).
200. Lemley, supra note 194, at 525.
201. Access Now, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1321; Noah, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 544-45; Stoutenbor-
ough, 59 F.3d at 583; Torres, 158 F. Supp. at 1038.
202. See Konkright, supra note 7, at 736 n.170 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 36.307(a) (2003))
(“This part does not require a public accommodation to alter its inventory to include
accessible or special goods that are designed for, or facilitate use by, individuals with
disabilities.”); see also Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999)
(finding that ADA did not require insurance company to alter type of insurance it offered).
203. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B at § 36.307 (2003); Doe, 179 F.3d at 559 (“[I]t is
apparent that a store is not required to alter its inventory in order to stock goods such as
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content reflects the ADA’s delicate balance between requiring accommo-
dation of disabilities and protecting the essence of a company’s goods
and services.204
The nexus approach with regard to Internet websites addresses the
ADA’s crucial distinction between access and content better than either
of the more extreme positions. Applying the ADA to all Internet
websites regardless of their connection to a physical place would ignore
this distinction, it can be argued, because some entities, particularly
Internet-only sites, might rightfully assert that the website itself is the
“good or service” being provided.205 These websites would argue that
accessibility alterations should not be required because requiring
changes to the website would require changes to the actual good or
service provided by the site.206 For example, an Internet search
engine, such as Google or Yahoo!, might assert that it should not be
required to make its website accessible to individuals with disabilities
because such a requirement would fundamentally alter the Internet
searching product it provides on its website.207 By contrast, the more
restrictive Access Now approach, which does not recognize any accessibil-
ity rights to websites, ignores the role of the Internet in permitting
access to the goods and services of places of public accommodation.
The nexus requirement, however, may largely avoid this debate
because it generally distinguishes between websites that are communica-
Braille books that are especially designed for disabled people.”); Parker, 121 F.3d at 1012.
The purpose of the ADA’s public accommodations requirements is to ensure
accessibility to the goods offered by a public accommodation, not to alter the
nature or mix of goods that the public accommodation has typically provided. In
other words, a bookstore, for example, must make its facilities and sales
operations accessible to individuals with disabilities, but is not required to stock
Brailled or large print books.
28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B at § 36.307 (2003).
204. See Doe, 179 F.3d at 560 (“The common sense of the statute is that the content of
the goods or services offered by a place of public accommodation is not regulated.”).
205. At least one critic has asserted that applying the ADA to the Internet may require
companies to alter the substance of their goods and services, which he claims is not
required by the ADA. See Konkright, supra note 7, at 739-44.
206. See Maroney, supra note 7, at 202-03 (arguing that access to goods and services
could mean merely access to the Internet, which does not regulate content of websites).
207. An analogous argument was successful in Cornilles v. Regal Cinemas, Inc., No.
Civ. 00-173-AS, 2002 WL 31440885 (D. Or. Jan. 3, 2002), in which deaf plaintiffs sought
closed-captioning of movies displayed at the theater so that the plaintiffs could “enjoy the
movies at the same level as hearing individuals.” Id. at *2. The court determined that the
ADA required the movie theater to provide access to all its movies to deaf patrons, but it
did not require the theater to provide special closed-captioning of those movies, in part
because such closed-captioned films had to be purchased by the theater as a separate
product. See id. at *3-6.
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tion devices and those that embody the very good or service offered by
the controller of the site. For example, it seems more likely that a
website connected to a physical place of public accommodation would be
considered a “communication” service of that place (and therefore
required to be accessible), rather than an actual good because, by
definition, the physical place must sell some good other than the website
from its physical location. Interpreting a website as a communication
device leads more clearly to a conclusion that the ADA would apply to
ensure the communications from places of public accommodation are
provided to individuals in a nondiscriminatory manner.208 Conversely,
by not requiring ADA compliance of websites unconnected to any
physical place of public accommodation, the nexus requirement avoids
regulation of the very websites that are most likely to claim that their
content is being improperly regulated by the ADA. Accepting ADA
regulation of a website that can be viewed as a communications vehicle
for physical places of public accommodation, whether used merely to
advertise or to sell goods and services directly, is less problematic than
if the website itself provides the only business outlet for a company.
Accordingly, unlike the more extreme positions, the nexus approach
recognizes and accommodates the various functions served by the
Internet.
D. The Nexus Approach is a Better Solution Than the Extreme
Alternatives
In attempting to analyze the role, if any, the ADA should play with
regard to Internet websites, the nexus approach provides an overlooked
alternative to the extreme positions on either side of this debate.
Contrary to the position of the court in Access Now and other strict
constructionists, the nexus approach would require a place of public
accommodation to make its website accessible. Contrary to the NCD’s
assertions, however, the approach does not recognize that every website
must be accessible because the nexus approach requires that only places
with physical facilities should be considered places of public accommoda-
tion.209 As described below, the court in Access Now misapplied the
nexus approach, while the NCD unfairly criticized it.
208. See Walker, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 1094 (noting that the issue regarding modification
of goods and services was not presented because “[t]he question is simply whether travel
agents who provide information regarding accessibility must do so in a non-discriminatory
manner”).
209. Until now it appears that the debate has focused on two positions: Either the
ADA does not apply to the Internet at all, or it applies to the entire Internet and requires
substantial modification of current websites. Compare supra note 2 with supra note 7.
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1. The Court in Access Now Misapplied the Nexus Ap-
proach. The only published decision that addresses the ADA in the
context of Internet websites, Access Now, does not apply the nexus
approach properly. Although the court in Access Now recognized the
nexus approach as set forth by the court in Rendon, the court then
misapplied it to conclude that the ADA did not regulate Southwest
Airline’s online website.210 In Access Now the court determined no
nexus existed between the website’s selling of airline tickets and any
particular airline ticket counter because the virtual ticket counters
provided by southwest.com did not exist in any particular geographic
location and, therefore, the website was not a specific, concrete
space.211 In essence, the court concluded that the “service or privilege”
at issue was the selling of tickets, which had a connection only to a
virtual website that was not a physical place of public accommoda-
tion.212 Therefore, according to the court, no nexus existed between
the selling of tickets and a physical place of public accommodation.213
The nexus analysis, however, should not be so limiting. Indeed, the
result in Access Now identifies a shift in argument that must be made
by those advocating for the ADA’s applicability to a particular website.
Rather than assert, as did plaintiffs in Access Now, that the ADA
requires equal access to a company’s website as a separate entity,214
such advocates should reframe their argument to assert that a website
is simply another means by which a covered entity communicates with
and sells goods to the public.215 Under this analysis, Southwest’s
physical ticket counters should be considered places of public accommo-
dation;216 thus any manner in which Southwest communicates with the





215. In fact in their brief on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, plaintiffs attempted to
make exactly this argument. See Brief for the Appellants at 17-23, Access Now (No. 02-
16163-BB). Southwest, however, criticized this argument as having not been asserted at
the district court level because plaintiffs had alleged that the website itself was the
discriminatory public accommodation. See Answer Brief for Appellee at 7, 27, 31-36, Access
Now (No. 02-16163-BB).
216. On appeal, Southwest Airlines argued that the ADA should not apply to its ticket
counters because discrimination by air carriers is addressed by a different statute, the Air
Carrier Access Act, which according to Southwest, specifically covers an airline’s ticketing,
information, and reservation services. See Answer Brief for Appellee at 37-41, Access Now
(No. 02-16163-BB). Although this argument may permit Southwest Airlines to prevail, it
would not apply to most places of public accommodation.
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public regarding its sale of tickets should be regulated by the ADA,
similar to the manner in which the ADA regulated the communication
of the travel agents in Walker.217 In other words, rather than focusing
on the website as the covered entity, advocates for the disabled should
assert that the website is a means by which the public is able to enjoy
the “goods, services, . . . privileges, [and] advantages”218 of a physical
place of public accommodation, such as the actual ticket counters of
Southwest.
The ADA requires that individuals with disabilities have equal access
to the goods, services, privileges, and advantages of covered entities.219
Once an entity is subject to the ADA as a place of public accommodation,
the ADA should not distinguish between the various manners in which
that entity sells its goods and services to the public; rather, the ADA
requires that the place of public accommodation not discriminate in any
way in which it interacts with the public, whether by selling tickets at
a physical ticket counter or over a virtual counter on the Internet.220
The conclusion drawn by the court in Access Now focused on the wrong
nexus connection: The connection is between the Internet website and
the business of the ticket counters, not between the selling of tickets and
the virtual ticket counter. The court should have looked at the website
as the service or privilege and determined whether it had a connection
to any physical place of public accommodation. By misconstruing the
nexus approach, the court in Access Now improperly limited the ADA’s
application.
2. A Justified Distinction. Conversely, in arguing for the
application of the ADA to all websites generally, the NCD unfairly
criticized the nexus approach by disapproving of the distinction drawn
by the nexus approach between companies that have physical facilities
and companies that are open to the public only on the Internet.221 The
NCD asserted that the “maintenance of legal distinctions among
otherwise similar Web sites, based on their connection or lack of
connection to a physical facility, will become increasingly untenable and
incoherent.”222 An obvious example of this distinction is that, under
the nexus analysis, the website of a bookstore with a physical location
217. See supra text accompanying notes 95-101.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2000).
219. See id.
220. See Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456, 459 (7th Cir. 2001) (“An insurance
company can no more refuse to sell a policy to a disabled person over the Internet than a
furniture store can refuse to sell furniture to a disabled person who enters the store.”).
221. See Position Paper, supra note 15, at 25.
222. Id.
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must be ADA compliant, while the website of Amazon.com, which also
sells books but does not maintain physical facilities open to the public,
does not.223
These distinctions, critics argue, are neither suggested by the language
of the statute nor consistent with the purpose of the ADA.224 First,
despite the statutory arguments made in Section B of this Part, neither
the statutory nor the regulatory language defining “place of public
accommodation” contains any explicit limitation to physical places.225
In fact, some courts have construed the ADA to apply to more than
physical places.226 Specifically, the First Circuit and several district
courts have concluded that Title III applies to insurance policies
provided either through an employer or sold over the phone, even though
not sold directly out of a physical insurance office.227 The First Circuit
noted in the seminal case that interpreted the ADA to include more than
physical places that
by including “travel service” among the list of services considered
“public accommodations,” Congress clearly contemplated that “service
establishments” include providers of services which do not require a
person to physically enter an actual physical structure. Many travel
services conduct business by telephone or correspondence without
requiring their customers to enter an office in order to obtain their
services. Likewise, one can easily imagine the existence of other
service establishments conducting business by mail and phone without
providing facilities for their customers to enter in order to utilize their
services. It would be irrational to conclude that persons who enter an
office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons who
223. See Lewis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 982 F. Supp. 1158, 1165 (E.D. Va. 1997) (“[A]n
insurer could freely discriminate in the provision of insurance without fear of ADA Title
III simply by not maintaining a physical office or by marketing its policies via the U.S.
mail.”); see also Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19.
[O]ne can easily imagine the existence of other service establishments conducting
business by mail and phone without providing facilities for their customers to
enter in order to utilize their services. It would be irrational to conclude that
persons who enter an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but
persons who purchase the same services over the telephone or by mail are not.
Congress could not have intended such an absurd result.
Id.
224. See, e.g., Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19-20 (applying ADA to insurance policies); Bick,
supra note 2, at 212-15; Stowe, supra note 16, at 323-25; Petruzzelli, supra note 2, at 1082-
83.
225. See, e.g., Carparts, 37 F.3d at 20 (“Neither Title III nor its implementing
regulations make any mention of physical boundaries or physical entry.”).
226. See, e.g., id. at 19; Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1165.
227. See, e.g., Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19; Lewis, 982 F. Supp. at 1165; Conners v. Maine
Med. Ctr., 42 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45-46 (D. Me. 1999).
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purchase the same services over the telephone or by mail are not.
Congress could not have intended such an absurd result.228
Courts, judges, and commentators extend the First Circuit’s conclusion
to assert that these distinctions argue in favor of applying the ADA to
the Internet.229 Most famously, in Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance
Co.,230 Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals stated in dicta that the core meaning of the ADA’s definition of
discrimination is that the owner or operator of a facility, “whether in
physical space or in electronic space”231 that is open to the public,
cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the facility and using it
in the same manner as do nondisabled persons.232 In Morgan v. Joint
Administrative Board,233 Judge Posner, again in dicta, expanded upon
this language and stated that “[a]n insurance company can no more
refuse to sell a policy to a disabled person over the Internet than a
furniture store can refuse to sell furniture to a disabled person who
enters the store.”234
Second, the purpose of the ADA is to “invoke the sweep of congressio-
nal authority . . . in order to address the major areas of discrimination
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.”235 The ADA was enacted
to “provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”236
With regard to Title III specifically, its purpose is “to bring individuals
with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American
228. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19. Carparts involved the question of whether a health
insurance plan was a place of public accommodation in that it was prohibited by the ADA
from discrimination with regard to the types of insurance policies it offered its members.
See id. at 14-15.
229. See, e.g., Doe 179 F.3d at 559; Parker, 121 F.3d at 1020 (en banc) (Martin, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that commerce is being conducted through, among other things, the
Internet, and under the majority’s view, “the same technological advances that have offered
disabled individuals unprecedented freedom may now operate to deprive them of rights
that Title III would otherwise guarantee”); Petruzzelli, supra note 2, at 1083 (noting that
a limitation to physical-only places “would mean that a mail order catalog company, that
only accepts business via the phone or mail, would be able to flat out refuse to serve
disabled individuals”).
230. 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).
231. Id. at 559 (citing Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19).
232. Id.
233. 268 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2001).
234. Id. at 459. At least in the First and Seventh Circuits, then, courts may be more
willing to look to the statute’s remedial purpose to find that the ADA is not limited to
actual, physical places, and therefore might apply to Internet websites generally.
235. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000).
236. Id. § 12101(b)(1).
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life . . . in a clear, balanced, and reasonable manner.”237 Application
of the ADA to the Internet, based upon this broad statement of purpose,
may be appealing on a superficial level in part because of the pervasive-
ness of the Internet in modern life. Intuitively we sense that if the ADA
truly was meant to incorporate disabled individuals into the mainstream
of America’s economic life, then such incorporation is likely unattainable
without access to the Internet.238 Of the statutory examples of “places
of public accommodation,” most have websites attached directly to
entities referenced by the statute.239 Indeed commercial websites offer
information and services similar to the examples listed in these parts of
section 12181(7) of the ADA.240 Along these lines, the NCD advocates
“fundamentally redefining what place means,”241 indicating that the
237. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (II) at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 382,
Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 99; see also Maroney, supra
note 7, at 199 (presenting examples from legislative history that would support a broad
reading of the ADA).
238. Hearings, supra note 2, at 31 (testimony of Steven Lucas) (discussing ways in
which the Internet “has become a place of public accommodation” because of the numerous
governmental and private functions that have been shifted to the Internet); Hearings,
supra note 2, at 54 (testimony of Judy Brewer) (“The Web is information; it is commerce,
education, employment opportunity, and entertainment. It has more resources than the
best research library in the world, and more jobs posted than any newspaper.”).
239. See, e.g., www.hotels.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2003); www.motel.com (last visited
Sept. 1, 2003); www.lodging.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2003); www.restaurant.com (last
visited Sept. 1, 2003); www.theater.com (which transfers the user automatically to
www.broadway.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2003)); www.entertainment.com (last visited Sept.
1, 2003); www.conventioncenter.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2003); www.bakery.com (last
visited Sept. 1, 2003); www.grocery.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2003); www.laundromat.com
(last visited Sept. 1, 2003); www.bank.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2003); www.barbershop.com
(last visited Sept. 1, 2003); www.shoerepair.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2003); www.museum
.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2003); www.schools.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2003); www.daycare
.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2003); www.bowling.com (last visited Sept. 1, 2003); see also
Carrie L. Kiedrowski, The Applicability of the ADA to Private Internet Web Sites, 49 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 719, 735-36 (2001) (noting that all but three of the examples listed in Title III
are already available on the Internet today).
240. See Maroney, supra note 7, at 194 (noting the existence of online pharmacies,
clothing stores, and music sites); see also Position Paper, supra note 15, at 13. The NCD
noted:
The Web sites people will use for shopping, for research, or for entertainment
readily come within the scope of the kinds of entities that are deemed public
accommodations. They provide goods and services to the public like stores, online
versions of games and entertainments that people might otherwise witness or
participate in-person; information of the sort in a less hectic, more personal way
might have obtained across the desk from one’s doctor; and access to the resources
of the world’s greatest libraries or the library down the street.
Position Paper, supra note 15, at 13.
241. Id. at 25.
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Internet should be considered a place because of the abundance of
“goods, services, informational resources, recreation, communication,
social and interactivities of all kind”242 available on the Internet.243
Thus, the NCD argues that the computer age and cyberspace have
“altered our notion of place”244 and this new concept of place, when
examined in light of the ADA’s purpose, should not countenance a
distinction among websites based upon their connection to a physical
place of public accommodation.245 By focusing on broader language in
the ADA regarding its purpose and on the current pervasiveness of the
Internet, critics assert that the nexus approach’s distinction is unjust,
and the ADA ought to apply broadly to all websites.
There are several responses to this criticism. First, the decision
regarding which entities are covered by the ADA is a politically sensitive
decision in which the costs and benefits of applying the statute to a
particular entity must be carefully weighed. There may be great
economic benefits to both disabled individuals and society at large in
making the Internet accessible to individuals with disabilities.246
Courts, however, are not equipped to balance the needs of the Internet
industry generally with the requirements of disabled individuals.247
Congress, not the judiciary, is the governmental branch best able to
resolve whether, and how, disabled individuals should have a statutory
right to access to the Internet because Congress is comprised of elected





246. See, e.g., Kiedrowski, supra note 239, at 740-41 (citing examples of benefits to
society of an accessible Internet, including access to text data for mobile phone users);
Petruzzelli, supra note 2, at 1092-93 (noting that accessibility would permit nondisabled
users to have better access to the Internet, including low technology, illiterate, and older
users).
247. See Access Now, 227 F. Supp. at 1321 n.13; Hearings, supra note 2, at 27
(testimony of Steven Lucas) (“There is a risk in applying the ADA to the Internet before
industry has been given an opportunity to address the issues of accessibility in a
commercial and a competitive environment.”). The court in Access Now found that the
ADA’s comprehensive definition of public accommodation meant that “Congress has created
specifically enumerated rights and expressed the intent of setting forth ‘clear, strong,
consistent, enforceable standards,’ ” meaning that courts must “follow the law as written
and wait for Congress to adopt or revise legislatively-defined standards that apply to those
rights.” 227 F. Supp. 2d at 1318. The court concluded that to fall within the scope of the
ADA, a public accommodation must be “a physical, concrete structure. To expand the ADA
to cover ‘virtual’ spaces would be to create new rights without well-defined standards.” Id.
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burdening businesses with additional regulation.248 Therefore, it may
be most appropriate for courts to refrain from acting unless Congress
has passed clear legislation applying to the Internet.
Indeed, Congress has the ability to regulate the interaction of
technology with individuals with disabilities when it deems such
regulation appropriate.249 For example, when Congress enacted the
ADA, it provided for detailed regulation of telephones and the television
system with regard to accessibility for disabled individuals.250 Title IV
of the ADA mandates that all telephone systems offer, as a standard
service, Telecommunication Devices for the Deaf services (“TDD
services”), thus permitting a deaf person to utilize the telephone.251
The statutory and regulatory provisions for this section are lengthy and
detailed,252 indicating that if Congress intended for the ADA to apply
to sophisticated technology such as the Internet or the telephone system,
it had the ability to provide a comprehensive scheme to do so.253 In
the same year that Congress enacted the ADA, it also enacted the
248. See id. at 1321 n.13. The court in Access Now noted that:
[I]n light of the rapidly developing technology at issue, and the lack of well-defined
standards for bringing a virtually infinite number of Internet websites into
compliance with the ADA, a precondition for taking the ADA into “virtual” space
is a meaningful input from all interested parties via the legislative process. As
Congress has created the statutorily defined rights under the ADA, it is the role
of Congress, and not this Court, to specifically expand the ADA’s definition of
“public accommodation” beyond physical, concrete places of public accommodation,
to include “virtual” places of public accommodation.
Id.; see also Hearings, supra note 2, at 26-27, 45-46 (testimony of Steven Lucas) (asserting
that premature application of the ADA to the Internet could slow development of
technology that makes the Internet more accessible to the disabled because such an
application now “could result in companies doing just what is necessary to comply with the
law instead of furthering the advancement of technology” and arguing that the cost of
potential litigation could discourage some Web sites from coming online); Hearings, supra
note 2, at 66 (testimony of Susyn Conway) (“New regulations imposed on companies
engaged in developing [the Internet] into a more reliable, better defined and manageable
resource—able to best serve every segment of our society—will only serve to slow down the
achievement of [high-performance] goals.”).
249. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (2000).
250. Id.
251. See id. A TDD machine allows a deaf person to converse on the phone using a
relay device that permits a deaf person to send and receive a text message over telephone
lines. See Rendon, 294 F.3d at 1281 n.1. This function utilizes either a machine or a live
operator to facilitate the conversation. See id.
252. 47 U.S.C. § 225(a)(2); 47 C.F.R. Part 64, Subpart F (2002).
253. See Konkright, supra note 7, at 75 (stating, “If the legislature determined that
telecommunications were of such a nature as to be regulated separately from places of
public accommodation, then the legislature would likely regard the Internet also to be of
a nature requiring narrowly tailored regulation of its access providers.”).
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Television Decoder Circuitry Act,254 which requires that television
manufacturers install equipment enabling televisions to display closed-
captioning signals to benefit hearing-impaired individuals.255 Both of
these examples are informative because they demonstrate that when
Congress desires to speak directly to a technological issue, particularly
regarding technology and the disabled, it does so with specific man-
dates.256 Put another way, we would expect that a decision as monu-
mental as applying the ADA generally to such far-reaching technology
as the Internet would be made explicitly by Congress in such a manner
that demonstrates a nuanced approach to the problem, as it did with
telephones and televisions.257
Furthermore, Congress already may have implicitly determined that
the ADA should not broadly apply to the Internet. Eight years after
passage of the ADA, Congress considered the impact of the Internet on
a law closely related to the ADA—the Rehabilitation Act258—which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of a disability by federal contrac-
tors. In 1998, Congress amended section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act
specifically to require that electronic and information technology of
federal agencies be accessible to disabled individuals.259 Section
508(a)(2)(A) requires the Architectural and Transportation Barriers
Compliance Board to provide standards and performance guidelines for
254. Pub. L. No. 101-431, 104 Stat. 960 (1990).
255. Id.
256. The words of one legislator speaking to the Television Decoder Circuitry Act could
apply just as well to the Internet today: “Undeniably, television is our most important
source of news, information, and entertainment programming. And as technological
breakthroughs involving fiber optics, high definition and digital television, and direct
broadcast satellites occur, the role television plays in our homes, businesses, and
communities will become even more pronounced.” 136 Cong. Rec. H8541 (1990) (daily ed.
Oct. 1, 1990) (statement of Rep. Markey). Interestingly, at least one commentator has used
these technology-oriented statutes to assert that the ADA should apply to the Internet
because such application would be “consistent with the attitudes of Congress towards the
critical relationship between handicapped people and access to telecommunications media.”
Adam M. Schloss, Web-Sight for Visually-Disabled People: Does Title III of the Americans
with Disabilities Act Apply to Internet Websites?, 35 COLUMBIA J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 35, 47-
48 (2001). The exact opposite conclusion from this evidence, however, is more persuasive:
Congress is able to, and should be allowed to, impose direct regulations upon emerging
technology with specific statutory provisions applying to the technology. See Konkright,
supra note 7, at 725. An old statute should not be applied to new technology based upon
implication and inference.
257. See Konkright, supra note 7, at 725 (“[T]he Internet is unfit for the general
treatment of Title III.”).
258. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-96 (2000).
259. Id. § 794(d).
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this technology.260 Some commentators assert that this congressional
action and the section 508 guidelines are persuasive evidence that the
ADA should apply to private websites because it demonstrated “a sign
that Federal agencies are serious about the accessibility of the Internet
for the disabled.”261 A stronger interpretation of section 508, however,
is that Congress did not intend for the ADA to require accessibility for
all private Internet websites because Congress could have amended the
ADA to so indicate at the same time it passed the Section 508 guide-
lines. Congress’s decision not to amend the ADA explicitly to include
Internet websites as places of public accommodation is evidence that
Congress does not intend for the ADA to apply so broadly to the private
sector.262
A second justification for the distinction criticized by the NCD is the
need for clarity in application. A physical-only application provides a
bright-line rule that not only informs companies whether they should be
compliant but also provides jurisdictional certainty.263 Broadly
applying the ADA to the Internet is not feasible when a website is based
in a foreign country but is accessible from the United States. For
example it is unclear whether a foreign website is bound by United
States laws if users can access the website from servers in the United
States. Although the jurisdictional aspect of the Internet is too
extensive a topic to be addressed here, this broad proposition seems
unworkable and, quite frankly, unenforceable.264 Applying the ADA
260. Id.
261. Ranen, supra note 2, at 401-02; see also Bick, supra note 2, at 209-10, 222-24
(asserting that the Access Board’s rules will set a standard for ADA compliance in
electronic technology and “will result in the perception that if a standard is good for
government it should also be applicable to the private sector”); Kiedrowski, supra note 239,
at 723, 727-28.
262. See Maroney, supra note 7, at 200 (noting that with the passage of the
Rehabilitation Act, “the issue of online accessibility was clearly addressed in the federal
government context without similar efforts being made to remedy the problems of disability
access in online commercial contexts.”).
263. But see Position Paper, supra note 15, at 25 (arguing that the nexus requirement
will cause “havoc”). The NCD attempts to argue that no bright line will develop and
presents the example of two online grocer companies, one with local pickup points and one
which only delivers. Id. The former will be subject to the ADA while the latter will not.
Id. Rather than indict the nexus requirement, however, this example merely highlights
that some companies are covered and some are not, which the statute itself already
recognizes. Otherwise the ADA simply could have used broad terminology, such as
requiring compliance by “any entity engaged in interstate commerce.”
264. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 100-01 (testimony of Elizabeth K. Dorminey)
(arguing that regulating U.S. based websites through the ADA might force site owners out
of the country, “beyond the reach of these regulations, making the U.S. less competitive in
this dynamic sector of the economy”).
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only to those websites related to entities that are physically located in
the United States avoids this problem and clarifies which entities must
comply with the ADA’s requirements.
Third, it is not inconsistent to apply a statute applying only to
businesses operating in a certain manner. Distinctions among business-
es are made constantly in statutory regulation,265 and in the ADA
specifically.266 For example Title I of the ADA (related to employment
practices) applies only to businesses with fifteen or more employees;267
although an arbitrary line, to be sure, it is one resulting in different
burdens being placed on companies with fourteen as opposed to fifteen
employees simply because of difference of one employee.268 Further-
more, by limiting Title III only to places of public accommodation,
Congress intentionally chose not to require general accessibility to places
that are not open to the public.269 Similarly it is doubtful that the
ADA applies to companies that solely sell goods through catalogs and
that do not have facilities open to the public, a distinction that already
distinguishes between types of companies who sell similar products but
differ in the manner in which they deal with the public.270 Accordingly
the entire Internet does not need to be a place of public accommodation
for certain parts of the Internet to still be accessible to individuals with
disabilities. Making a website ADA-compliant is simply another cost of
doing business for companies that choose to operate physical locations
open to the public.
Finally, but not insignificantly, the differing burdens placed on similar
businesses, one that has a physical location and one that does not, may
force Congress to address this issue definitively. Until that time comes,
265. See Dominion Hotel Inc. v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265, 269 (1919) (“[T]he inevitable
result of drawing a line” is “distinctions [that] are distinctions of degree; and the constant
business of the law is to draw such lines.”).
266. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2000).
267. Id.
268. See Clackamus Gastroenterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (“[T]he
Congressional decision to limit the coverage of the legislation to firms with 15 or more
employees has its own justification that must be respected—namely easing entry into the
market and preserving the competition position of smaller firms.”).
269. See Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc., 215 F.3d 1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding
that the ADA only applied to the parts of cruise ships that fall within the statutory
enumeration of public accommodations but not the parts that are not public accommoda-
tions, such as the crew’s quarters or the engine room).
270. Compare Hearings, supra note 2, at 97 (testimony of Elizabeth K. Dominy) (“No
one has successfully argued that catalogs or magazines are ‘public accommodations’ and
should be made available in Braille or audio recordings . . . .”) with Hearings, supra note
2, at 142-43 (testimony of Professor Peter David Blanck) (asserting that catalogs should be
regulated by the ADA).
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however, the ADA should apply to a great number of websites, which
may result in a competitive advantage from a new flock of customers
who can access their goods.271 Indeed the economic benefits of ADA
compliance for websites may become so clear that a market resolution
is brought to this matter before Congress acts.272 At the same time,
this more limited application would avoid problems of overbreadth that
would occur under the all inclusive solution of those advocating that the
ADA apply broadly to the entire Internet. In other words, the nexus
approach has the practical advantage of providing a test run at applying
the ADA to the Internet without the downside of a judicially-imposed
sweeping mandate regulating a new technology.
In summary, the nexus approach has practical policy advantages
because it reflects Congress’s unwillingness to amend the ADA to apply
specifically to the Internet generally, and it provides Congress with the
opportunity to carefully weigh the costs and benefits of such a sweeping
statute.
IV. IF THE ADA DOES APPLY TO WEBSITES OF PLACES OF PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION, THEN WHAT DOES THE ADA REQUIRE?
The ADA is different than other antidiscrimination statutes because
it requires a balance between the costs and benefits of making a public
accommodation accessible.273 Therefore even if the ADA applies to the
website of a physical place of public accommodation, the question
remains open regarding the type of alterations or modifications, if any,
that would be required of a website in order to comply with the
nondiscrimination provisions of the ADA. This Part attempts to address
this final issue.
A place of public accommodation that does not make its website
accessible to individuals with disabilities may be engaging in one or
more of the three types of discrimination defined by the statute: (1)
excluding individuals from the full and equal enjoyment of its services
(the “exclusion” provision); (2) failing to make reasonable modifications
271. Schloss, supra note 256, at 56-57 (proposing federal subsidies to make websites
compliant because, in part, such subsidies would stimulate private market competition for
the patronage of disabled online customers, forcing competitors to also become compliant).
272. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 20-21 (testimony of Gary Wunder); Id. at 27, 35
(testimony of Steven Lucas); Id. at 109-10 (testimony of Peter David Blanck).
273. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000) (requiring “reasonable modifications in
policies, practices, or procedures”); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii) (requiring that a public
accommodation “take such steps as may be necessary to ensure that no individual with a
disability is excluded, denied services, segregated or otherwise treated differently than
other individuals because of the absence of auxiliary aids and services”).
2004] THE ADA IN CYBERSPACE 1005
in policies, practices or procedures, when such modifications are
necessary to afford these goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantag-
es, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities (the “reasonable
modifications” provision); and (3) failing to provide auxiliary aids and
services to ensure that no disabled individual is excluded, denied
services, or treated differently (the “auxiliary aids and services”
provision).274 Each of these discrimination provisions has specific
requirements and limitations. For example, under the reasonable
modifications provision, a policy or practice must be modified unless the
modification would “fundamentally alter the nature of [the] goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations.”275
Similarly an auxiliary aid or service must be provided so long as the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations are
not fundamentally altered or the provision does not result in an undue
burden,276 which is defined as a “significant difficulty or expense.”277
The ADA regulations further mandate that auxiliary aids and services
include “[q]ualified interpreters . . . assistive listening devices [and]
systems, telephones compatible with hearing aids, closed caption
decoders, open and closed captioning, telecommunications devices for
deaf persons . . . videotext displays, or other effective methods of making
aurally delivered materials available to individuals with hearing
impairments.”278 The regulations also state that aids and services are
“[q]ualified readers, taped texts, audio recordings, [b]raille materials,
large print materials, or other effective methods of making visually
delivered materials available to individuals with visual impair-
ments.”279 These aids and services must provide equivalent informa-
274. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i), (ii), & (iii). Indeed these are three of the four types
of discrimination alleged by the National Federation for the Blind (“NFB”) in its lawsuit
against AOL, in which the NFB claimed that AOL’s inaccessibility to the blind was in
violation of the ADA. See Ranen, supra note 2, at 414-15. The fourth type, alleging a
failure to remove communication barriers is likely not applicable because the statute
requires such barriers to be structural. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Although under
the nexus approach, as articulated by this Article, it is doubtful that AOL is required to
comply with the ADA because it is not a physical place of public accommodation, AOL
ultimately settled this litigation and agreed to make its Internet services accessible to
disabled individuals. See Ranen, supra note 2, at 412.
275. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
276. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iii).
277. 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2003). The Department of Justice considers several factors in
determining whether an accommodation creates an undue burden on a place of public
accommodation, including the “nature and cost of the action needed” and “the overall
financial resources of the site.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.104.
278. 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(b)(1) (2003).
279. Id. § 36.303(b)(2).
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tion to a disabled individual as is provided to a nondisabled individual.
These requirements of, and limitations to, a public accommodation’s
duties under the ADA will play a significant role in determining the
ADA’s effect on websites as places of public accommodation. Exactly
how each of these standards would apply to an Internet website is open
to considerable debate.
The ADA’s applicability to websites of places of public accommodation
may require extensive renovations of current websites in order to
adequately communicate information to individuals with disabilities. A
court in the Northern District of Georgia recently found that a public
transportation authority likely did not meet its obligations under Title
II of the ADA because it did not adequately provide information
regarding maps and route schedules in accessible formats, including on
its website.280 Accessibility requirements could include making the
website able to be read by screen access software that translates text
information on a website into either synthesized speech or braille.281
To make a website accessible by the screen access software, the design
of the website should include text descriptions of the site’s pictures and
graphics in order for those aspects of the site to be understood and
translated by the screen access software.282 Moreover, according to
some advocates for the disabled, hyperlinks should contain meaningful
labels describing the content of the link, and web-based forms should be
280. Martin v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 225 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1377 (N.D.
Ga. 2002). Title II of the ADA has more explicit regulations regarding technology than
does Title III. See id. (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 37.167 (2002)) (requiring public entities to make
“adequate communications capacity available, through accessible formats and technology,
to enable users to obtain information and schedule service”). Despite applying Title II
rather than Title III standards, Martin does provide some insight into what, if any,
communication formats might be available for a place of public accommodation to utilize
instead of altering its website. See id. (discussing a 24-hour phone line and providing route
information in braille).
281. See, e.g., Ranen, supra note 2, at 415; Bick, supra note 2, at 216; Petruzzelli, supra
note 2, at 1065-66. As explained by one commentator, the screen access software converts
text from the website into braille or voice so a blind reader can receive the information.
Ranen, supra note 2, at 415. Instead of using a mouse, visually disabled and individuals
with muscular impairments may use the tab key to move around an accessible screen. See
id.; see also Petruzzelli, supra note 2, at 1065-66.
282. Hearings, supra note 2, at 18-19 (testimony of Gary Wunder) (describing
technology available for blind users to access the Internet); Ranen, supra note 2, at 415-16;
Bick, supra note 2, at 217; McKee & Fleischaker, supra note 169, at 36; Petruzzelli, supra
note 2, at 1090-91. Ranen notes that as much text as possible in the website should be in
the “ASCII” text in order to make it easier for the software to read. Ranen, supra note 2,
at 416. McKee and Fleischaker also assert that websites should be made navigable
without the use of a mouse. McKee & Fleischaker, supra note 169, at 36.
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simplified.283 Additionally, websites should be accessible to more than
the blind: Hearing disabled individuals cannot hear audio clips on
websites, and individuals with learning disabilities may not be able to
navigate websites with a complicated layout and design.284
Some commentators suggest that the regulations promulgated by the
Access Board under section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act, which applies
only to federal agencies, should be the standards utilized when applying
the ADA to private entities.285 These standards would “require
simultaneous text to accompany all audio, video to be captioned, and
color-keyed information to be restricted, among other things.”286 Other
standardized accessibility requirements have been issued by the Web
Accessibility Initiative (“WAI”) International Program Office at the
World Wide Web Consortium (“W3C”), which some commentators assert
could be used by courts to provide standards for websites under the
ADA.287 Rather than provide any hard and fast financial estimates of
the costs of either converting a noncompliant website or creating a new
compliant website, many advocates for these changes simply state
conclusively that these modifications are “a simple task”288 that should
not cause an undue burden.289
Of course opponents of applying the ADA to websites claim that the
cost and effort of making a current website compliant would be extreme
and debilitating to businesses that are growing increasingly more
dependent upon the Internet.290 For example, one group has estimated
283. See Ranen, supra note 2, at 416.
284. Hearings, supra note 2, at 31-32 (testimony of Steven Lucas); Petruzzelli, supra
note 2 at 1066, 1091.
285. See Bick, supra note 2, at 222-25.
286. Id. at 226. Bick also asserts that the ADA might also require labels for all icons
that “pop up” and “have text labels for graphics that would help the visually impaired; offer
captions for audio material that would help the hearing impaired; and enable Internet
users to disable blinking or moving elements that would help the cognitive impaired.” Id.
at 226-27.
287. Hearings, supra note 2, at 20 (testimony of Gary Wunder); Hearings, supra note
2, at 55-56, 84-85 (testimony of Judy Brewer). Of course, nothing in the statute or the
regulations authorizes such reliance on this purely private standard.
288. Ranen, supra note 2, at 415.
289. See Ranen, supra note 2, at 415; McKee & Fleischaker, supra note 169, at 36
(noting that various groups offer a free analysis of a website’s accessibility); Hearings,
supra note 2, at 52, 59 (testimony of Judy Brewer) (“Web accessibility solutions are
generally inexpensive and easy to implement.”); but see Petruzzelli, supra note 2, at 1091
(noting that the cost of conversion is “not trivial,” but that the “statute does allow for a
sliding scale approach so that accessibility can be prioritized depending upon the financial
status of the website”).
290. Many of these opponents seem to assert that the purported costs of making a
website accessible provide a basis for the position that the ADA should not apply to any
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“that modifying an existing website to make it accessible would cost on
average approximately $160,000.”291 Others have predicted that
“[h]undreds of millions of existing pages would be torn down,”292 and
the cost of publishing websites will increase because amateur publishers
will not have the expertise to make a site compliant.293 Revenue-
generating graphics and advertisements may have to be discarded to
provide space for accessible formatting.294 The cost of accessibility on
the Internet would also be a recurring cost because web pages are often
built and modified every day as “[g]raphics and icons are constantly
added and pages redesigned to remain competitive and up to date.”295
As one commentator noted, “While particular cost figures may be
difficult to calculate, the reduction in the number of websites and the
restriction on Internet growth as a whole could have a significant impact
on the industry, and consequently, the overall economy.”296
If not first addressed by Congress, resolution of this debate will most
likely be done by a district court based upon the particular factual record
before it; thus, it is difficult to determine what types of accessibility
requirements might be considered reasonable. A defendant might utilize
the undue burden and “readily achievable” defenses to assert that the
Internet website. Hearings, supra note 2, at 116-17 (testimony of Walter Olson). That
analysis, however, seems backwards because by definition, an Internet website would not
be required to be accessible if the cost created an undue burden or was not readily
achievable. Therefore the ADA theoretically would apply only to websites for which the
cost of accessibility was not excessive. A valid point regarding the cost and applicability
of the website, however, is that any court decision applying the ADA to a website would
likely lead to further litigation and subsequent high litigation costs for any company
defending whether its Internet site needed to be compliant. See Christopher G. McDonald,
Access to the Internet: Should the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”) Apply to Private
Web Sites?, LAW & THE INTERNET (Fall 2002), at 8, available at http://gsulaw.gsu.edu/law
and/papers/fa02/mcdonald/) (noting high litigation costs and citing Hearings, supra note 2,
at 116-17 (testimony of Walter Olson)).
291. See Brief of the Equal Employment Advisory Council and the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellee and in
Support of Affirmance at 31, Access Now, Inc. (No. 02-16163-BB) (citing Susan Kuchinskas,
Building a Barrier-Free Web, NEW ARCHITECT, Dec. 2002, at 2, available at http://www
.newarchitectmag.com/documents/s+7733/na1202c/index/html). In the same article cited
by the amicus parties in their brief, however, the author noted that the cost of making a
new website accessible can be almost nothing. See Susan Kuchinskas, Building a Barrier-
Free Web, NEW ARCHITECT, Dec. 2002, at 2, available at http://www.newarchitectmag.com/
documents/s+7733/na1202c/index2/html.
292. Hearings, supra note 2, at 116-17 (testimony of Walter Olson).
293. Id.
294. See Taylor, supra note 9, at 42.
295. Maroney, supra note 7, at 203.
296. McDonald, supra note 290, at 8.
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financial resources of the company simply do not permit an expensive
overhaul of its website. Until such issues are resolved by the courts or
by Congress, however, public accommodations can take steps short of
implementing a full set of changes to comply with the W3C or section
508 requirements.297 These steps may prove acceptable under the
ADA to offer effective communication and to provide goods and services
to disabled individuals on a level equivalent to nondisabled individu-
als.298
In a letter from the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to Senator Tom
Harkin, for example, the DOJ recognized that “[i]nstead of providing full
accessibility through the Internet directly, covered entities may also offer
other alternate accessible formats, such as Braille, large print, and/or
audio materials, to communicate the information contained in the web
pages.”299 As suggested by the DOJ, the availability of such materials
should be referenced in the website along with instructions for obtaining
the materials.300 Indeed, a text message on a website could reference
a customer to a toll-free telephone helpline.301 Although this may
prove costly because it might require 24-hour staffing,302 it may not
add significant extra cost if such a line is already provided for other
purposes. Moreover a company could provide the same information in
print catalogs in braille format.303 Other efforts short of full accessibil-
297. See Kiedrowski, supra note 239, at 728-29.
298. Hearings, supra note 2, at 108 (testimony of Peter Blanck) (“As an alternative to
providing full accessibility through the Internet, Title III covered entities may offer their
services in other effective accessible formats.”).
299. Letter, supra note 94, at 1.
300. Id.
301. See Peter D. Blanck & Leonard A. Sandler, ADA Title III and the Internet:
Technology and Civil Rights, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 855, 856 (2000);
Hearings, supra note 2, at 142-43 (testimony of Peter Blanck) (noting that a catalog
distributed by a place of public accommodation could comply with the ADA by having “a
phone number in the back saying, get somebody to call this number for you if you need
help, and we will read it to you over the phone or will send a Braille version”).
302. Blanck & Sandler, supra note 301, at 856. In Martin, the Northern District of
Georgia stated that providing information promptly in alternative formats, such as braille
and staffing a 24-hour phone line may satisfy the guidelines in the ADA if the procedures
are followed correctly. See 225 F. Supp. 2d at 1377. The NCD, however, asserts:
This is largely an academic question, however, since there is no practical way for
this to be done. There is no feasible way, at any remotely acceptable cost, that the
information provided in an instant, on-demand, 24-7, and the interactive capacity
afforded by a transit agency’s Web page, could be replicated or equaled via a
telephone assistance system, let alone by the mailing out of hard-copy documents.
Position Paper, supra note 15, at 11.
303. See Blanck & Sandler, supra note 301, at 856; Hearings, supra note 2, at 142-43
(testimony of Peter Blanck). Questions might be raised, however, regarding the timeliness
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ity arguably would satisfy the ADA, such as providing parallel web
pages that have similar content but without graphics or other features
that exclude disabled individuals.304
In sum, even if the ADA requires websites of public accommodations
to be accessible, it does not necessarily follow that a public accommoda-
tion must implement the full regiment of accessibility changes suggested
by section 508 or the W3C. The ADA requires that equivalent, but not
necessarily equal, communication and access must be provided. If a
public accommodation determines that modifying a website poses a
significant expense, then it should consider providing identical informa-
tion and services through alternative means to the Internet.
V. CONCLUSION
The nexus approach provides that an intangible means of providing
access to goods or services is subject to the requirements of the ADA if
it has some connection to a physical place of public accommodation.
Because places of public accommodation use Internet websites to
communicate with the public and to sell their goods and services, these
websites have the necessary nexus and must comply with the ADA. In
addition to being based on the statutory language of the ADA, the nexus
requirement has the advantage of reflecting the virtual nature of a
website and its ability to be both a point of access and an actual good or
service itself. Moreover, the nexus approach avoids many of the
practical difficulties posed by more extreme, “all-or-nothing” approaches.
It provides some protection for individuals with disabilities, but it does
not overwhelm a new technology with uncertain demands. Additionally,
it provides a basis for Congress to determine whether to extend the
requirements of the ADA more broadly to all Internet websites. In the
face of the two extreme positions such as those presented in Access Now
and by the NCD, the nexus approach provides a more reasonable and
principled alternative.
of such catalogs when compared to the instant accessibility of the Internet. Blanck &
Sandler, supra note 301, at 856. Also the cost of printing braille catalogs might prove
prohibitive compared to updating a website in an accessible format. Id.
304. See Maroney, supra note 7, at 203.
